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“Kill the Sea Turtles” and Other Things
You Can’t Make the Government Say
Scott W. Gaylord*
Abstract
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court
confirmed that there is no heckler’s veto under the government
speech doctrine. When speaking, the government has the right to
speak for itself and to select the views that it wants to express. But
the Court acknowledged that sometimes it is difficult to determine
whether the government is actually speaking. Specialty license
plates have proven to be one of those difficult situations, raising
novel and important First Amendment issues. Six circuits have
reached four separate conclusions regarding the status of
messages on specialty license plates. Three circuits have held that
specialty plates are private speech, one has held that specialty
plates are government speech, and another has held that specialty
plates are hybrid speech. Yet another circuit has held that the
issue is nonjusticiable under the Tax Injunction Act. And the
uncertainty continues as North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma
currently confront litigation over their license plates—litigation
that will determine whether states or third parties have the right
to select the messages on specialty license plates.
This Article explores the Court’s “recently minted” government
speech doctrine in the context of specialty plates. In particular, it
analyzes the circumstances under which a state can adopt one
message (“Save the Sea Turtles”) while refusing to authorize
opposing viewpoints (“Kill the Sea Turtles”). To date, the majority
of circuits have applied a literal speaker test, which looks to see if
a reasonable observer would view specialty plates as government
or private speech. Under that test, specialty plates are private
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speech, and any restrictions on the content of such plates must be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral, even if a state disagrees with
that message.
This Article contends that a careful review of Summum,
which was decided after all but one of the circuit court decisions,
shows that the majority interpretation is wrong. The literal
speaker test is inconsistent with the “control” test set out in
Summum and Johanns. Under the Court’s new test for
government speech, many specialty license plate programs are
government speech, and third parties cannot force states to
promulgate messages with which they disagree. If a state has a
“Save the Sea Turtles” plate to promote conservation and the
protection of its wildlife, it cannot be forced to offer a “Kill the Sea
Turtles” plate. And the same holds true for more controversial
messages such as “Choose Life” in North Carolina as well as
Texas’s ban on plates containing divisive images such as a
Confederate flag. Thus, this Article concludes that Summum
marks a significant development in the Court’s free speech
jurisprudence, one that affirms the states’ ability to control the
messages on their specialty license plates as well as their other
expressive activity.
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I. Introduction
Sometimes important First Amendment issues hide in plain
sight. Such is the case with specialty license plates. We see them
all the time: “special” messages on license plates that celebrate
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various organizations and causes, including the military, the
environment, professional sports, education, civic groups,
recreational activities, historical events, and other interesting
(and sometimes novel) things associated with a state.1 But who
has control over the content of these specialty license plates? Do
states get to decide what messages go on these plates or do
nongovernmental actors dictate the content? If a state has a
“Save the Sea Turtles” plate, must it allow a “Kill the Sea
Turtles” plate to avoid discriminating based on viewpoint? Or,
with respect to more controversial and socially divisive issues,
must all of the states with a “Choose Life” plate also offer a
“Respect Choice” plate? Must Texas authorize a “Sons of
Confederate Veterans” plate, which includes a Confederate flag, if
the group petitions for one?
As it turns out, the answers to these questions involve
important—and highly contested—issues of First Amendment
law. These questions have confounded the lower courts, leading to
a four-way split among six circuits,2 and challenges are ongoing
in North Carolina,3 Texas,4 and Oklahoma.5 The only thing that
1. Each of the 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, has specialty license plate programs. License Plate
Information, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
transportation/license-plate-information.aspx (last updated July 2011) (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Although the number of specialty plates offered varies by jurisdiction, currently
there are more than 4,600 specialty plates available across the country, and the
number appears likely to continue to increase. Id.
2. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (invalidating a
specialty license plate program under the First Amendment); Ariz. Life Coal.
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v.
White, 547 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 629 (4th Cir.
2002) (same). But see ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir.
2006) (upholding a specialty license plate program under the First Amendment);
Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2005) (dismissing the
challenge for lack of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act).
3. See ACLU of N.C. v. Conti, 835 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62–63 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
(challenging North Carolina’s “Choose Life” license plate).
4. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, No. A-11-CA1049-SS, 2013 WL 1562758, at *26 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2013) (seeking a court
order to force Texas to provide a license plate with a confederate flag to
members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans).
5. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2013)
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the circuit courts have agreed on is that the government’s ability
to control the message on its specialty plates depends on whether
the plates are government speech or private speech.6 This
determination is dispositive because “[t]he Free Speech Clause
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not
regulate government speech.”7
Under the Court’s “recently minted”8 government speech
doctrine, the government has the right to “speak for itself”9 and
“to select the views that it wants to express.”10 As a speaker, the
government can discriminate based on content and even
viewpoint11 “to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted.”12 In the specialty license plate context, this means that
when speaking a state can issue a “Save the Sea Turtles” plate
(challenging an Oklahoma statute that prevented the plaintiff from covering an
image on his license plate depicting a Native American shooting an arrow
toward the sky).
6. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (“To
determine whether Missouri’s specialty license plate scheme survives a First
Amendment challenge, we must first decide whether the messages contained on
specialty plates communicate government or private speech.”); Ariz. Life Coal.
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We must decide whether, by
authorizing a specialty license plate . . . the State of Arizona has adopted that
speech as its own.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va.
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e turn first to the
question of whether the speech on the special plates authorized by the Virginia
legislature is private speech or ‘government speech.’”).
7. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
8. Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
9. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
229 (2000).
10. Summum, 555 U.S. at 460.
11. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor
and disfavor points of view . . . .”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)
(arguing that if the government violated the Constitution when it chose to fund
a program that advances certain goals to the detriment of other goals, then
numerous government programs would be unconstitutional); Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Thus, even ordinarily impermissible viewpointbased distinctions drawn by the government may be sustained where the
government itself speaks or where it uses private speakers to transmit its
message.”).
12. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995).
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without offering a plate advocating for the opposite—“Kill the Sea
Turtles.” And the constitutional analysis is the same for more
socially and politically charged topics such as “Choose Life” or
“Respect Choice.”
Of course, the opposite is true if the government is regulating
private speech in a forum: “In the realm of private speech or
expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker
over another.”13 If a state’s specialty plate program creates a
forum for private speech, then the government is limited in its
ability to restrict the speakers who may participate in the forum:
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every
type of speech. The State may be justified “in reserving [its
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics.” The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not
without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against
speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”14

Any restriction on private speech in the forum must be, at a
minimum, viewpoint neutral and “reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.”15 Consequently, if a state allows a
license plate on a given topic, it must permit all viewpoints on
that issue—whether the plates involve sea turtles, abortion, the
military or any other topic.16
As the Court acknowledged in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum,17 though, “there may be situations in which it is
difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its
own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”18 Specialty
license plates have proven to be one of those situations. Six
13. Id. at 828.
14. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001)
(citations omitted).
15. Id. at 107.
16. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (explaining that there is “a distinction
between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of th[e] limited forum, and . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum’s limitations”).
17. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
18. Id. at 470.
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circuit courts have reached four different conclusions regarding
the status of messages on specialty license plates.19 The Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits consider specialty license plates to be
(primarily) private speech, offering drivers an opportunity to
promote a group or cause with which they agree.20 The Fourth
Circuit views specialty plates as hybrid speech, involving both
government speech and private expression.21 In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit holds that these plates are government speech,
which means that the government can make viewpoint-based
distinctions and allow a “Choose Life” plate while rejecting a
“Respect Choice” plate.22 The Fifth Circuit contends that the Tax
Injunction Act23 (TIA) divests the federal courts of jurisdiction
over challenges to specialty plate programs because the extra
charge for specialty plates constitutes a tax for TIA purposes.24
The First Amendment analysis is made all the more difficult
because all but one of these circuit court cases were decided
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Summum,25 which set out
19. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e now
join the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and
fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the organization that
sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the specialty license plate.”).
21. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he speech here appears to be neither purely government speech nor
purely private speech, but a mixture of the two.”); id. at 800 (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (“I am pleased that the court adopts today the view that speech can
indeed be hybrid in character.”).
22. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (“As
in Johanns, here Tennessee ‘sets the overall message to be communicated and
approves every word that is disseminated’ on the ‘Choose Life’ plate. It is
Tennessee’s own message.”).
23. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
24. See Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (“To fulfill
the purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, and because the specialty plate charges
cannot under these facts constitute regulatory fees, we are persuaded that the
additional charges for specialty plates must be characterized as taxes.”).
25. Not surprisingly, much of the commentary regarding specialty license
plates also predates Summum. See, e.g., Traci Daffer, A License to Choose or a
Plate-ful of Controversy? Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L.
REV. 869 (2007); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008); Caroline M. Corbin, Mixed
Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605
(2008); Jeremy T. Berry, Comment, Licensing A Choice: “Choose Life” Specialty
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the Court’s most recent and most thorough explanation of the
government speech doctrine.26 Under Summum’s “recently
minted” government speech doctrine, governmental control over
the expressive activity is the touchstone for government speech.27
States may speak through their specialty license plates and reject
unwanted messages if they exercise the requisite authority over
their specialty plate programs.28
The circuits reaching the opposite conclusion have adopted a
“literal speaker” test, which focuses on “one key question:
whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party.”29 Under this test, a state loses
the right “to select the views that it wants to express”30 because
vehicle owners—who reasonable observers think are sending the
message—can force it to authorize specialty plates (“Kill the Sea
Turtles” or “Respect Choice”) that directly contradict its intended
message.31 Consequently, the literal speaker test is inapplicable
in the specialty plate context because it requires states either to
accept a proliferation of unwanted messages or to close the
alleged specialty plate forums.32 Summum, though, demonstrates
License Plates and Their Constitutional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605, 1624–
30 (2002); Jack Guggenheim & Jed Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at
the Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special Registration Organization
Plates, Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 563, 577–79 (2000).
26. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (ruling
that the placement of permanent monuments in a public park is government
speech and therefore not analyzed under strict scrutiny).
27. See id. at 472–73 (finding that monuments in a city-run park
constituted government speech because the city exercised complete control in
selecting the content of the monuments).
28. See id. (allowing a city to select the content of monuments in a city-run
park because doing so constitutes government speech).
29. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Choose
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the
most obvious speakers in the specialty license plates context are the vehicle
owners and the sponsoring organizations).
30. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468.
31. See White, 547 F.3d at 863–64 (stating that the vehicle owners are the
most obvious speakers in the specialty license plate context).
32. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557,
576 (1995) (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon
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that the literal speaker test puts states in such an untenable
position that “‘public forum principles . . . are out of place in the
context of this case.’”33 Pursuant to the government speech
doctrine, states that retain “effective control” over their specialty
plate programs cannot be forced to promote “Kill the Sea Turtles”
or any other message with which they disagree. Instead, these
states can claim the “fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”34
Contrary to the majority view among circuit courts,35 these
states can allow specialty plates on mundane and even
controversial topics without providing for alternative viewpoints.
To demonstrate why this is the case, Part II of this Article sets
out the split among the circuit courts, exploring the differences
between and among the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and analyzes the government speech
a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s
right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”).
33. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478 (2009) (quoting
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003)).
34. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
35. The majority of circuits follow the “literal speaker” test. See Roach v.
Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that specialty license plates
are private speech). This approach bears “one key question: whether, under all
the circumstances, the reasonable and fully informed observer would consider
the speaker to be the government or a private party.” Id. at 867. In answering
this question, the courts look at four factors: the purpose of the program; the
degree of editorial control exercised by the state; the identity of the literal
speaker; and whether the state or the private speaker bears the ultimate
responsibility for the message. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r
of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)
(invalidating a specialty license plate program). In Roach, the court applied
these four factors and joined the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in
concluding that the “reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the
speaker to be the organization that sponsors or the vehicle owner who displays
the specialty license plate.” Roach, 560 F.3d at 867; see also Ariz. Life Coal. Inc.
v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that specialty license
plates constitute “primarily private speech” under the literal speaker test);
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
under the literal speaker test, “[m]essages on specialty license plates cannot be
characterized as the government’s speech”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v.
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that specialty license plates
constitute a mixture of government and private speech under the literal speaker
test).
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doctrine as developed in Summum.36 Part III explains why
Summum’s control test for government speech is inconsistent
with the literal speaker test that the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits employ.37 The literal speaker test focuses on
the wrong person in the communicative process—the viewer
instead of the government speaker—and, in the process, ignores
the Court’s finding that the government’s intended meaning may
be interpreted differently by different observers. Moreover,
contrary to the suggestion of several circuit courts, the Court’s
decision in Wooley v. Maynard38 does not support a finding that
specialty plates are government speech.39 Finally, Part IV
demonstrates why, in light of Summum, the Court’s forum
doctrine applies neither to monuments nor specialty license
plates.40 As a result, states retain their First Amendment rights
as speakers to control their messages without having to permit
other groups to advance inconsistent or undesired messages on
the governments’ property.
II. An Overview of the Government Speech–Private Speech Divide:
Summum and the Split Among Circuit Courts
The complexity of the First Amendment issues implicated by
specialty license plates garnered national attention in the early
2000s as states began issuing controversial plates, such as
“Choose Life.”41 In the wake of Planned Parenthood of
36. Infra Part II.
37. Infra Part III.
38. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
39. See id. at 716–17 (prohibiting New Hampshire from prosecuting
criminally individuals who, due to their moral and religious beliefs, cover the
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates).
40. Infra Part IV.
41. “Choose Life” license plates were not the only controversial specialty
plates that fostered legal challenges. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 610 (4th Cir.
2002) (dealing with a proposed Confederate flag license plate). As discussed
below, one of the first challenges involved Virginia’s denial of a specialty plate to
the Sons of Confederate Veterans, which proposed a plate that included a
Confederate flag as part of the design. Id.
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,42 states sought to regulate
abortion in a variety of ways, from banning partial birth
abortions43 to promoting childbirth through “Choose Life” license
plates.44 These “Choose Life” plates spawned litigation across the
country,45 and the federal courts were deeply divided as to how
these challenges should be handled under the First
Amendment.46 Lacking Supreme Court guidance, several circuits
borrowed from the Court’s reasonable observer test in
Establishment Clause cases47 and developed a literal speaker test
for government speech—whether a reasonable observer would
view the specialty plates as government or private speech.48 None
of these cases, however, applied the Court’s most recent
government speech case, Summum.
The challenges to specialty plates continue today, with
litigation ongoing in the Fourth Circuit regarding North
Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate,49 Texas’s rejection of a Sons of

42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey challenged a Pennsylvania law that imposed
various restrictions on receiving an abortion. Id. at 844–45. These restrictions
include informed consent, a twenty-four hour waiting period, spousal
notification, and reporting requirements. Id. at 881–900.
43. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 917–18 (2000) (invalidating
Nebraska’s partial birth abortion ban); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168
(2007) (validating a federal ban on partial birth abortions).
44. See, e.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir.
2008) (stating that over 25,000 residents of Illinois joined a petition to create a
“Choose Life” license plate).
45. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir.
2008) (challenging a “Choose Life” license plate); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d
860, 862–63 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); White, 547 F.3d at 855 (same).
46. Compare White, 547 F.3d at 853 (invalidating a “Choose Life” license
plate), with ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a “Choose Life” license plate).
47. See Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620
(1989) (stating that the constitutionality of government actions challenged
under the Establishment Clause should be “judged according to the standard of
a ‘reasonable observer’” (citation omitted)).
48. See Roach, 560 F.3d at 867 (concluding that the reasonable observer of
a specialty license plate would consider the speaker to be the sponsoring
organization and the vehicle owner).
49. See generally ACLU of N.C. v. Conti, 835 F. Supp. 2d 51 (E.D.N.C.
2011).
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Confederate Veterans plate,50 and Oklahoma’s standard issue
plate that includes an image related to a Native American
religion.51 These current cases, though, are being litigated against
a First Amendment landscape that has changed dramatically
with Summum’s advancement of a new standard for government
speech.52 As discussed below, this standard undermines the
literal speaker test that the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits previously applied to specialty license plates.53
Consequently, Summum sets the stage for a new wave of
litigation regarding the ability of states to promote preferred
messages through their specialty plate programs.
A. The Circuit Split
Given the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the
complexity of the First Amendment issues involved, courts
understandably have struggled with the constitutionality of
specialty plates. While the courts are divided as to the proper
constitutional standard for specialty plates,54 they agree on one
thing—that the critical question is whether specialty plates are
government speech.55 Prior to the wave of “Choose Life” license
50. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, No. A-11-CA1049-SS, 2013 WL 1562758, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2013) (seeking a court
order to force the State of Texas to provide a license plate with a Confederate
flag to members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans).
51. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1141–42 (10th Cir. 2013)
(challenging an Oklahoma statute that prevented the plaintiff from covering on
his license plate an image of a Native American shooting an arrow toward the
sky).
52. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2009) (finding
that monuments in a public park constitute government speech because the
municipality controls the messages sent by the monuments).
53. Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
54. Compare ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that Tennessee’s specialty license plate was government speech because
Tennessee effectively controlled the messages delivered by the license plates),
with Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
determinative factor in these cases is whether the reasonable observer would
conclude that the government is speaking).
55. See, e.g., Roach, 560 F.3d at 863 (“To determine whether Missouri’s
specialty license plate scheme survives a First Amendment challenge, we must
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plate cases, the Supreme Court had indicated in cases like Rust v.
Sullivan56 and Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System v. Southworth57 that the government had the right to
speak for itself.58 The Court, however, did not provide a detailed
explanation of the government speech doctrine.59 That changed in
2009 when the Court decided Summum. After Summum, to
determine whether specialty plates are government or private
speech, courts first must discern whether the literal speaker test
or Summum’s control test governs that determination.60 A careful
review of Summum and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n61
reveals that the control test provides a new standard, one that is
incompatible with the literal speaker test.

first decide whether the messages contained on specialty plates communicate
government or private speech.”); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
963 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We must decide whether, by authorizing a specialty license
plate . . . the State of Arizona has adopted that speech as its own.”); Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e turn first to the question of whether the
speech on the special plates authorized by the Virginia legislature is private
speech or ‘government speech.’”).
56. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
57. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
58. See id. at 235 (explaining that when the government speaks “it is, in
the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy”);
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Valezquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (explaining that while
“[t]he Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors . . . amounted to government speech[,] when
interpreting the holding in later cases, . . . we have explained Rust on this
understanding”).
59. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (invalidating under the First
Amendment a federal statute that prohibited the Legal Services Corporation
from providing funding to public interest legal organizations that challenge or
attempt to amend existing welfare law).
60. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (stating
that the parties “disagree sharply about the line of precedents” that applies in
determining whether the government is speaking).
61. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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1. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ Four-Factor Test: Specialty
Plates as Private Speech or Hybrid Speech
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to consider the
constitutionality of restrictions on specialty license plates.62 The
court was asked to decide whether Virginia could deny a specialty
plate because of a Confederate flag that was incorporated into the
proposed design of the plate.63 Pursuant to a Virginia statute, the
Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV), a nonprofit organization,
applied for a specialty license plate.64 The proposed plate would
bear the group’s name and its emblem, which included a
Confederate flag.65 The Commonwealth of Virginia granted SCV’s
application for an organizational specialty plate but only with
what was, from the SCV’s perspective, a significant
modification—the SCV could not include its emblem on the
plate.66 SCV filed suit, claiming that Virginia violated its First
Amendment rights by restricting its expression in a forum that
was generally open to all organizations that met the statutory
requirements, which SCV did (as evidenced by Virginia’s issuing
a modified form of its specialty plate).67
The Fourth Circuit recognized the novelty of SCV’s First
Amendment claim as well as the important threshold question it
raised: “No clear standard has yet been enunciated in our circuit
or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is
‘speaking’ and thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions,
and when it is regulating private speech and thus unable to do
so.”68 Lacking direct guidance, the Fourth Circuit adopted a four62. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 610 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating Virginia’s
specialty license plate program under the First Amendment).
63. Id. at 613–14.
64. Id. at 613.
65. Id.
66. Id. Unlike other statutes that authorized specialty plates, the statute
approving an SCV plate precluded SCV from including its emblem on the plate.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-746.22 (West 2013) (“No logo or emblem of any
description shall be displayed or incorporated into the design of license plates
issued under this section.”).
67. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F. 3d at 614.
68. Id. at 618.

“KILL THE SEA TURTLES”

107

factor test that other circuits had developed in other First
Amendment contexts.69 Under the SCV test, courts resolve
whether specialty plates are government speech or private speech
by considering
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in
question occurs; (2) the degree of “ editorial control” exercised
by the government or private entities over the content of
the speech; (3) the identity of the “ literal speaker”; and
(4) whether the government or the private entity bears the
“ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.70

Applying these factors, the SCV court concluded that specialty
plates were private speech in a designated specialty license plate
forum.71 Virginia had created its specialty plate forum to raise
money and to permit groups to promulgate their own messages.72
The organizations had control over the design of the plates.73
Drawing on Wooley, the court concluded that the driver was the
literal speaker and bore ultimate responsibility for the message:
“[T]he special plates are mounted on vehicles owned by private
persons, and the Supreme Court has indicated that license plates,
69. See Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.
2001) (applying the four-factor test in determining whether a sign listing the
private sponsors of a public holiday display constituted government speech);
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085,
1093–95 (8th Cir. 2000) (considering similar factors to resolve whether
announcements of sponsors’ names and short messages from sponsors on a
public radio station were government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (using the same reasoning to decide whether
postings to school bulletin boards were government speech or private speech).
70. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
71. Id. at 614. See also Berry, supra note 25, at 1624–30 (stating that
specialty plates create a designated public forum because “the ‘Choose Life’
plates involve an intentional effort by the states to open a nonpublic forum, the
standard state license plate”); Guggenheim & Silversmith, supra note 25, at
577–79 (contending that specialty plates create a designated or limited public
forum while vanity plates are a nonpublic forum).
72. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 620 (“If the General
Assembly intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed
collection of a designated amount of money from private persons before its
‘speech’ is triggered.”).
73. See id. at 614 (stating that designing a specialty plate is a collaborative
process—the organization proposes the design and the state approves it).
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even when owned by the government, implicate private speech
interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to
the driver or owner of the vehicle.”74 As a result, Virginia’s
precluding of SCV’s emblem constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.75
In Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose,76 the
Fourth Circuit once again was called on to decide the
constitutionality of a state’s specialty license plate program.77 The
South Carolina legislature, at the behest of two state legislators,
approved a “Choose Life” specialty plate but not a corresponding
pro-choice plate.78 Planned Parenthood of South Carolina sued,
claiming that South Carolina’s specialty plate program favored a
specific viewpoint on abortion (“Choose Life”) and, consequently,
discriminated against other viewpoints (such as “Respect
Choice”).79 The panel employed the four-factor test articulated in
SCV and reached a similar conclusion—that the state engaged in
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.80 Yet the Rose panel’s
reasoning differed significantly from the analysis in SCV. Instead
of finding that the plates were private speech, the court, with
each member of the panel writing a separate opinion, determined
that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate “embodie[d] a mixture
of private and government speech.”81
Judge Michael, who wrote the most detailed opinion,
distinguished SCV on the grounds that the “Choose Life” plate
was initiated by state legislators, not a private organization like
SCV.82 As a result, “the purpose of the Choose Life Act is
74. Id. at 621 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)).
75. Id. at 626–27.
76. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
77. See id. at 795–800 (finding that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” license
plate constituted viewpoint discrimination).
78. Id. at 788.
79. Id. at 793.
80. Id. at 793–94.
81. Id. at 793; see also L. Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling
Government and Private Speech, 36 UNIV. OF MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 97 (2002)
(contending that specialty plates contain “a mixture of government and private
speech”).
82. Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004).
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specifically to promote the expression of a pro-life viewpoint,” not
simply the message of a private group.83 Unlike Virginia’s
specialty plate program, the South Carolina legislature “exercises
complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the
Choose Life plate.”84 The first two factors, therefore, favored
government speech, while the second two—the literal speaker
and ultimate responsibility—still weighed in favor of private
speech.85 Accordingly, the “Choose Life” plate constituted hybrid
speech: “Therefore, the speech here appears to be neither purely
government speech nor purely private speech, but a mixture of
the two.”86
SCV did not involve and consequently did not consider what
standard applies when the message on a government-owned
license plate implicates both government and private speech.87
Confronted with this indeterminate result, the Rose panel relied
on the Supreme Court’s forum analysis, considering whether the
government opened a forum and, if so, whether it could engage in
viewpoint discrimination in that forum.88 Although writing in
separate opinions, the panel agreed that, having created a forum
for private expression, South Carolina could neither “giv[e] its
own viewpoint privilege above others” in that forum nor
“authorize cloaked advocacy that allows the State to promote an
idea without being accountable to the political process.”89 Those
who viewed the “Choose Life” plate would not think that the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 793–94.
86. Id. at 794.
87. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that specialty license
plates constitute private speech).
88. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir.
2004) (“In the license plate forum, South Carolina has authorized the expression
of only one position of the debate, thereby promoting the expression of one
viewpoint (pro-life) while preventing the expression of the other viewpoint (prochoice).”).
89. Id. at 795; see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618 (“The
rationale behind the government’s authority to draw otherwise impermissible
viewpoint distinctions in the government speech context is the accountability
inherent in the political process.”).
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government was the literal speaker and, therefore, could not hold
the government accountable through the electoral process.90
Thus, South Carolina’s approving a “Choose Life” plate amounted
to viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.91
In Arizona Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton,92 the Ninth Circuit
applied the Fourth Circuit’s SCV four-factor test and reached the
same result as the SCV court—that the specialty plate was
private speech.93 The specialty plate program in Stanton differed
significantly from the programs in SCV and Rose. Whereas
Virginia and South Carolina had to pass legislation authorizing
each specialty plate, nonprofit organizations seeking an Arizona
specialty plate could submit an application directly to the Arizona
Department of Transportation (Arizona DOT).94 Once the Arizona
DOT certified that the organization was a nonprofit, it submitted
the plate request to the Arizona License Plate Commission.95
Pursuant to statute, the Commission was required to issue the
specialty plate if the organization served the community,
contributed to the welfare of others, and was not offensive or
discriminatory in its purpose or name.96 Under this
90. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 794–95 (arguing that the state’s advocacy of the
pro-life viewpoint is veiled because people do not identify the state as the
speaker in the specialty license plate context).
91. Id. at 799 (“In sum, South Carolina has engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by allowing only the Choose Life plate, and it has insulated itself
from electoral accountability by disguising its own pro-life advocacy. This is
prohibited by the First Amendment.”); see also id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring)
(“[W]here the private speech component is substantial and the government
speech component less than compelling, viewpoint discrimination by the state is
prohibited.”).
92. 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008).
93. Id. at 960 (“Messages conveyed through special organization plates—
although possessing some characteristics of government speech—represent
primarily private speech.”).
94. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404 (2011) (outlining the procedures by
which special organizations may obtain specialty license plates).
95. See id. § 28-2404(A) (stating that if the department “determines the
organization meets the [statutory] requirements of an organization . . . , the
department shall submit the request for a special organization plate to the
license plate commission”); Stanton, 515 F.3d at 961 (discussing the Arizona
specialty license plate program).
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404(B) (2011). Pursuant to statute, the
organization also could not “promote a specific religion, faith or antireligious
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administrative procedure, neither the legislature nor the
executive had the authority to approve (or to deny) the
organization’s plate or to control the plate’s design or content:
“[T]he statutory requirements address who may speak, not what
they may say.”97
The Arizona Life Coalition, a nonprofit, applied for a “Choose
Life” plate.98 Despite meeting Arizona’s statutory requirements,
the Commission denied its application, and the Arizona Life
Coalition sued on First Amendment grounds.99 The plaintiffs
argued that the Ninth Circuit should apply Johanns, a 2005
compelled subsidy case that involved government speech, when
deciding whether specialty plates were government speech.100 The
Ninth Circuit declined the invitation and instead distinguished
Johanns, arguing that Johanns did not apply because Arizona
Life Coalition’s claims implicated neither compelled speech nor
compelled subsidies.101 According to the court, the operative First
Amendment question was whether Arizona Life Coalition was
“‘being denied the opportunity to speak on the same terms as
other private citizens within a government sponsored forum,’” not
whether third parties were being forced to contribute money to
the government to sponsor the speech of others.102
Moreover, even though Johanns involved a compelled
subsidy, the court viewed Johanns as consistent with the Fourth
Circuit’s four-factor test.103 Because the Commission had only “de
minimis editorial control over the plate design and color,” there
was no basis for “finding that the messages conveyed by the
belief.” Id.
97. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966.
98. Id. at 961.
99. Id. at 962.
100. See id. at 964 (addressing the issue of whether Johanns applied to the
case at hand).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 (6th Cir.
2006) (Martin, J., dissenting)).
103. See id. at 965 (“We therefore adopt the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor
test—supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns—to determine
whether messages conveyed through Arizona’s special organization plate
program constitute[d] government or private speech.”).
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organization constitute government speech.”104 Under Arizona’s
administrative procedure for specialty plates, the Arizona Life
Coalition controlled the message on the plate, not the state, and
individual vehicle owners chose to carry their favored message.105
As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the specialty plates
were private speech and that the Commission engaged in
viewpoint-based discrimination in denying the Arizona Life
Coalition’s specialty plate application.106 The Arizona program
did not prohibit abortion-related speech and was open to all
organizations that met the statutory requirements.107 Because
Arizona Life Coalition met those requirements, the court
remanded the case with instructions to require the Commission
to issue the “Choose Life” plate.108
2. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ Literal Speaker Test:
Specialty Plates as Private Speech
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on the First
Amendment status of specialty license plates.109 Under Illinois
law, specialty plates required legislative approval.110 Choose Life
of Illinois, Inc. pursued legislation that would authorize a
104. Id. at 966. The Ninth Circuit also analogized specialty plates to vanity
license plates, which, subject to some general rules precluding offensive and
sexual references, or both, enable vehicle owners to select a specific combination
of letters and numbers on a state issued license plate (for example, CRZN,
4HIM, T TIME, and L8 AGN). See id. at 967. The fact that “most courts that
have addressed vanity plates have concluded the messages are private speech”
reinforced its conclusion that specialty plates also are private speech. Id. at 967;
see also Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no First
Amendment right to use a vanity plate bearing the letters “SHTHPNS”); Lewis
v. McDonald, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2001) (addressing whether a state
could deny a request for a vanity plate reading “ARYAN-1”).
105. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[I]ndividual members who choose to purchase the [‘Choose Life’] plate
voluntarily choose to disperse that message.”).
106. Id. at 973.
107. Id. at 971.
108. Id. at 973.
109. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2008).
110. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600(a) (2012) (“The Secretary of State shall
issue only special plates that have been authorized by the General Assembly.”).
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“Choose Life” plate, collecting more than 25,000 signatures from
prospective purchasers.111 Despite the broad support for such a
plate, the Illinois legislature did not approve the plate.112 Choose
Life Illinois then brought an action alleging that the state had
violated the group’s free speech rights by denying it access to the
state-created specialty plate forum.113 The district court agreed
with Choose Life Illinois, finding that the state had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination.114
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the court
found the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits persuasive,
it determined that the four-factor test “can be distilled (and
simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the
circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to
be the government or a private party.”115 Echoing the analysis in
Rose and Stanton, the court concluded that specialty plates were
private speech,116 because (i) reasonable observers are apt to
associate a specialty plate with the sponsoring organization and
the vehicle owner rather than the state, (ii) the government’s
purpose is to raise money through the specialty plate program
and not to express its own message, and (iii) the state and the
sponsoring groups share editorial control regarding the plate’s
111. White, 547 F.3d at 857.
112. See id. at 855 (“Despite the strong showing of support, the proposal for
a ‘Choose Life’ license plate died in subcommittee.”).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 857 (“[T]he [district] court concluded that the Illinois
specialty-plate program established a forum for private speech and that the
exclusion of the ‘Choose Life’ message from this forum was viewpoint
discrimination and could not withstand strict scrutiny.”).
115. Id. at 863. In Summum, Justice Souter advocated for the same test:
“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully
informed observer would understand the expression to be government speech, as
distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige.” Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460. 487 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). As discussed
below, Justice Souter’s concurrence reprises the test that the majority rejected
in Johanns, and no other Justice joined his concurrence in Summum. See infra
notes 186–87.
116. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[The court] arrive[s] at the same conclusion as in . . . Rose, and Stanton:
Messages on specialty license plates cannot be characterized as the
government’s speech.”).
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message and design.117 Consistent with Stanton, the court also
held that Johanns did not convert the private speech into
government speech because specialty plates did not implicate
compelled speech or a compelled subsidy.118
Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White119 makes the First
Amendment analysis of specialty plates even more complicated
because the Seventh Circuit departed from Stanton by holding
that Illinois’s denial of the “Choose Life” plate did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination.120 Although the distinction between
content and viewpoint discrimination “is not a precise one,”121 the
Seventh Circuit surmised that the State of Illinois had excluded
the entire subject of abortion, not simply a particular viewpoint
on that subject.122 Under the Supreme Court’s forum doctrine,
such content-based exclusion is permissible in a limited
designated forum provided that it is reasonable.123 The court
concluded that Illinois’s exclusion of the topic of abortion was
117. See id. at 863–64 (describing the factors that weigh in favor of finding
elements of private speech that rule out the government-speech doctrine).
118. See id. at 863 (“Like many states, Illinois invites private civic and
charitable organizations to place their messages on specialty license plates.”).
119. 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008).
120. See id. at 865 (“[The restriction of abortion-related specialty-plates] is a
permissible content-based restriction on access to the specialty-plate forum, not
an impermissible act of discrimination based on viewpoint.”).
121. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831
(1995).
122. See White, 547 F.3d at 865 (determining that Illinois had excluded the
entire subject of abortion from specialty plates, resulting in a permissible
content-based restriction). As the concurrence notes, the only evidence that
Illinois decided to exclude the subject of abortion “is nothing more than the
Illinois legislature rejecting efforts to approve a single specialty license plate,
‘Choose Life.’ . . . by rejecting a ‘Choose Life’ plate, it is not clear to me that the
legislature decided to exclude ‘the entire subject of abortion.’” Id. at 867 (Manion,
J., concurring).
123. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”); Ariz. Life Coal. v.
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A limited public forum exists when
the government intentionally opens a nonpublic forum to expressive activity by
a certain class of speakers to address a particular class of topics.” (citing
Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2003))).
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reasonable because “messages on specialty license plates give the
appearance of having the government’s endorsement, and Illinois
does not wish to be perceived as endorsing any position on the
subject of abortion.”124 Thus, the Illinois legislature’s denying the
“Choose Life” plate did not violate the free speech rights of
Choose Life of Illinois because those rights were not implicated by
Illinois’s specialty license plate forum.
In Roach v. Stouffer,125 the Eighth Circuit also was called on
to resolve whether a “Choose Life” specialty plate was
government speech or private speech.126 Under Missouri’s
specialty plate program, there were two ways to get specialty
plates approved: (i) legislative enactment and (ii) department of
revenue (DOR) approval.127 Choose Life of Missouri submitted an
application to the DOR for a “Choose Life” plate and met the
124. White, 547 F.3d at 855. There is a palpable tension in the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis. The court concludes that specialty plates are private speech
because their “messages are most closely associated with drivers and the
sponsoring organizations, and the driver is the ultimate communicator of the
message.” Id. at 864. If true, then it is not clear why the government reasonably
can believe that third parties will view the state as endorsing a message about
abortion. Id. at 855. After all, under the Seventh Circuit’s simplified version of
the SCV test, a reasonable observer considers the speaker to be the driver, not
the government. Id. at 864. That is the main reason why specialty plates are
private speech. Hence, the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Stanton is
unavailing.
125. 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009).
126. Id. at 863.
127. See id. at 862 (noting that Missouri provides two methods to create
specialty license plates); MO. REV. STAT. § 301.3150 (2012) (describing the
process for department of revenue approval). The Eighth Circuit considers only
the administrative process and does not have occasion to analyze whether the
legislative process, pursuant to which the legislature passes a statute creating a
specialty plate, might make the government responsible for the content of the
specialty plate. See Roach, 560 F.3d at 869–70 (analyzing the amount of
discretion allowed in the administrative process for the approval of specialty
plates). This latter question is important given that (a) the legislative process
accounted for roughly seventy of Missouri’s specialty plates and (b) the Missouri
legislature has passed legislation creating a variety of specialty license plates
(for example, “We Shall Not Forget,” “God Bless America,” “Conservation,” and
“Be an Organ Donor”) that are not (at least on their face) readily identifiable
with a sponsoring organization and that may express a policy that the state of
Missouri seeks to promote and encourage. Id. at 862; see also MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 301.3032–.3148 (noting various specialty license plates approved by the
Missouri legislature).
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statutory requirements under Missouri law.128 Under the DOR
process, though, a joint committee on transportation reviewed
each application and voted to approve or deny the specialty plate
request.129 If the joint committee “receives a signed petition from
five house members or two senators that they are opposed to the
approval of the proposed license plate,” then the committee must
reject the application.130 Because two senators objected to the
“Choose Life” plate, the committee denied Choose Life of
Missouri’s application.131 In response, the organization sued,
arguing that the denial of its application violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.132 The district court ruled that the
specialty plates were private speech and that Missouri’s DOR
process lacked adequate guidelines to prevent viewpoint
discrimination.133
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit identified the same threshold
question as the other circuits: “whether the messages contained
on specialty plates communicate government or private
speech.”134 After reviewing the case law from other circuits, the
court adopted White’s simplified version of the SCV test—the
literal speaker test: “Our analysis boils down to one key question:
whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party.”135 Following SCV, Stanton, and
White, the Eighth Circuit concluded that specialty plates are
private speech under this test: “[W]e now join the Fourth,
Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and
128. Roach, 560 F.3d at 863.
129. See id. at 862 (“The department of revenue shall submit for approval all
applications for the development of specialty plates to the joint committee on
transportation oversight during a regular session of the general assembly for
approval.” (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 301.3150 (2012))).
130. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 21.795(6) (2005) (amended 2009)).
131. Id. at 863.
132. See id. (claiming violation of “rights to free speech, due process and
equal protection under the United States Constitution”).
133. See id. (“The district court held that the specialty plates constituted
private speech and that the statutory scheme lacked adequate guidelines to
prevent viewpoint discrimination by the state . . . .”).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 867.
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fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays
the specialty license plate.”136
Although the SCV test included four factors, Roach
reasonably included the Fourth Circuit in the list of courts
applying the literal speaker test. Under Judge Michael’s analysis
in Rose, “no one who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with
the phrase ‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that
vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.”137 From this, he concluded that
the literal speaker “appears to be the vehicle owner, not the
State, just as the literal speaker of a bumper sticker message is
the vehicle owner, not the producer of the bumper sticker.”138
Judge Michael also acknowledged that the “same reasoning”
applies to the “ultimate responsibility” prong of the SCV-Rose
test.139 Given that the reasoning is the same for the literal
speaker and ultimate responsibility prongs, Roach reasonably
views these factors as being effectively the same.140 Moreover,
although the first two SCV factors suggested government speech
and the second two factors indicated private speech, the Fourth
Circuit ultimately treated the South Carolina “Choose Life” plate
as private speech in a designated limited forum based in large
part on the identity of the speaker as determined by a reasonable

136. Id.
137. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir.
2004).
138. Id. at 794. As discussed more fully below, the bumper sticker analogy,
while having superficial appeal, misrepresents two important aspects of the
specialty plate context. First, unlike with bumper stickers, the state owns the
license plates. They are government property and bear the name of the issuing
state. Second, in states like Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee, each specialty plate must be authorized by legislative act. The
legislative and executive branches have exclusive authority to decide on the
language and symbols included on the plate. The government lacks such control
over the content of bumper stickers.
139. Id.
140. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Our analysis
boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party.”).
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observer.141 Thus, even in the Fourth Circuit, the literal speaker
prong appears to be determinative in the specialty plate context.
Applying the literal speaker test, the Eighth Circuit,
following Rose and White, relied heavily on its assessment of the
purpose of the specialty plate program—to raise money and to
allow private groups to promote their organizations and
messages—and how a reasonable person would interpret the
specialty plates—as conveying a message on behalf of the
sponsoring organization and the vehicle owner.142 Given that
Missouri offers more than 200 specialty plates, “a reasonable
observer could not think that the State of Missouri communicates
all of those messages.”143 In addition, the reasonable observer
would know that the owner made the effort to purchase the
specialty plate to convey her own message and not a message
forced on the owner by the state.144 Thus, specialty plates
promoted private speech in a state-created forum, and Missouri
could not discriminate against particular viewpoints in that
forum.145 Because Missouri’s specialty plate scheme provided “no
standards or guidelines whatsoever,”146 the joint committee had
“unbridled discretion” to deny Choose Life of Missouri’s
application based on the organization’s viewpoint.147 This
unfettered
discretion
rendered
the
DOR
process
unconstitutional.148

141. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 798 (“The medium here—the specialty license
plate scheme—is more like a limited forum for expression than it is like a
school, museum, or clinic.”).
142. See, e.g., Roach, 560 F.3d at 867–68 (“[T]he organizations that sponsor
the specialty plates and the vehicle owners who choose to purchase and display
them are the literal speakers who bear the ultimate responsibility for the
message.”).
143. Id. at 868.
144. See id. (“[A] reasonable observer would understand that the vehicle
owner took the initiative to purchase the specialty plate and is voluntarily
communicating his or her own message, not the message of the state.”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 869.
147. See id. at 869–70 (reviewing the statute and noting that no standard for
review for specialty plates is given).
148. Id. at 870.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
claim that specialty plates were government speech under the
Court’s 2009 Summum decision.149 In a footnote, the Eighth
Circuit attempted to distinguish Summum.150 Whereas Summum
dealt with “privately-donated monuments in a city park,”
specialty plates implicated “a much different issue: whether
specialty license plates on privately-owned vehicles communicate
government speech.”151 According to the Eighth Circuit, specialty
plates, unlike monuments in public parks, permit expressive
conduct on the part of organizations and their supporters, not the
government.152
The Eighth Circuit’s discussion of Summum ignores an
important feature of the Court’s reasoning—that donors may
send a message through a monument even though the
government accepts the monument for its own, and possibly
different, reasons: “[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and
consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a
government entity that accepts and displays such an object may
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”153
The Fraternal Order of Eagles certainly received a benefit from
having its name, symbols, and message inscribed on a monument
in a city park even though, as the Court confirmed in Summum,
Pleasant Grove City adopted that monument to send its own
message.154 Thus, contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s cursory
149. See id. at 868 (“[W]e conclude that the messages communicated on
specialty plates are private speech, not government speech.”).
150. Id. at 868 n.3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009).
154. The Ten Commandments monument in Summum is “virtually
identical” to the monument displayed on the Texas Capitol grounds that was at
issue in Van Orden. Summum, 555 U.S. at 483 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005) (describing the monument of
the Ten Commandments). Both monuments were “donated by the Eagles ‘as
part of that organization’s efforts to combat juvenile delinquency.’” Summum,
555 U.S. at 483 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701). As the Court noted in Van
Orden, the State of Texas “had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and
commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency” even
though the monument included “the text of the Ten Commandments[, a]n eagle
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attempt to distinguish Summum, Summum and Johanns have
much more to say about the government speech–private speech
distinction. In fact, as I argue below, these cases articulate a new
test for government speech, a test that is inconsistent with the
literal speaker test adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits.
3. The Sixth Circuit’s Johanns Test: Specialty Plates as
Government Speech
In 2006, the Sixth Circuit was asked to consider the
constitutionality of Tennessee’s specialty plate program.155 The
Tennessee legislature had passed a statute authorizing a “Choose
Life” plate.156 Pursuant to that statute, half of the proceeds from
the sale of the plate went to New Life Resources, Inc., which had
to use the funds “exclusively for counseling and financial
assistance, including food, clothing, and medical assistance for
pregnant women in Tennessee.”157 While the bill was being
considered, certain pro-choice groups sought to amend the statute
to allow a “Pro-Choice” specialty plate, but the legislature
rebuffed their requests.158 After the “Choose Life” plate was
approved, the American Civil Liberties Union and others
challenged Tennessee’s “Choose Life” plate, arguing that the
statute violated the speech rights of groups advocating
alternative viewpoints on the abortion issue.159 The district court,
applying the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test, agreed and
enjoined enforcement of the statute.160

grasping the American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, . . . two small tablets
with what appears to be an ancient script . . . [,] two Stars of David and the
superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ.” Van Orden,
545 U.S. at 681–82.
155. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
156. Id. at 372.
157. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306(c) (2013)).
158. Id.
159. See id. (claiming the act is facially unconstitutional).
160. Id.
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On appeal, a split panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed. The
majority relied on the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Johanns,
contending that Johanns established a new test for government
speech: “Johanns stands for the proposition that when the
government determines an overarching message and retains
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the
message must be attributed to the government for First
Amendment purposes.”161 In Johanns, the Court emphasized the
government’s complete control—“from beginning to end”—over
the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” message.162 As a result, instead
of analyzing the four factors set out in SCV and Rose, the Sixth
Circuit focused on the level of control the Tennessee legislature
had over the “Choose Life” plate.163 The majority determined that
Tennessee had the same type of control over the “Choose Life”
license plate as the government had over the beef advertising
campaign in Johanns.164 Under Tennessee’s statutory scheme,
the legislature established “the overall message to be
communicated,” “wield[ed] ‘final approval authority over every
word used,’” and “retain[ed] a veto over its design.”165 Thus, the
“Choose Life” plate was government speech, promulgating
“Tennessee’s own message.”166
That the “Choose Life” plate was government speech meant
that Tennessee’s specialty plate program did not create a forum
for private speech and, consequently, that Tennessee could
promote a “Choose Life” message on its specialty plates without
offering plates expressing other views on abortion. Given that
“[g]overnment in this age is large and involved in practically
every aspect of life,” the majority found it reasonable that
“Tennessee would use its license plate program to convey
messages regarding over one hundred groups, ideologies,
161. Id. at 375.
162. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005)
(noting that Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture set the overarching
message and a committee, answerable to the Secretary, developed the
remaining details).
163. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562).
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activities, and colleges.”167 If specialty plates were private speech,
the state would lose its ability to convey its preferred messages in
other contexts as well, such as “Register to Vote” pins, “Win the
War” stamps, and “Spay or Neuter your Pets” license plates.168
Moreover, Tennessee might be required to approve plates for the
KKK and the American Nazi Party.169 According to the court,
“[s]uch an argument falls of its own weight” and eviscerates the
government’s right to speak for itself.170
In dissent, Judge Martin sought to distinguish and limit
Johanns to the compelled subsidy context. According to Judge
Martin, Johanns dealt with a compelled subsidy “where who is
speaking is determinative, and if it is the government, consistent
with its broad taxing authority, that speech is immune from First
Amendment challenge.”171 Tennessee’s specialty plate program
was meant to foster private speech,172 so Johanns simply did not
apply in the speech forum context:
Thus, the government speech doctrine, a la Johanns, is not the
determinative question in this case. The specialty license plate
issue at hand does not involve compelled speech. It does not
involve a compelled subsidy for a private entity. And, it does
not involve a compelled subsidy to support a government
message.173

On this view, Johanns is not “a watershed First Amendment
case” and “does not transform all First Amendment doctrine.”174
Instead, Johanns is concerned only with the compelled subsidy of
speech, which Judge Martin believes is far removed from
Tennessee’s specialty license plate program.175 For Judge Martin,
Tennessee’s program, like the programs in Rose, Stanton, and
167. Id.
168. Id. at 378–79.
169. Id. at 376–79.
170. Id. at 377.
171. Id. at 387 (Martin, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 381.
173. Id. at 386.
174. Id. at 387 n.12.
175. See id. at 387 (noting that the harm “is being denied the opportunity to
speak on the same terms as other private citizens within a government
sponsored program”).
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Roach, impermissibly discriminates based on viewpoint by
allowing a “Choose Life” plate while prohibiting alternative views
on abortion.176
B. Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine: Johanns
Applies Broadly to All Speech over Which the Government Has
Effective Control
In the wake of Bredesen, SCV, Rose, Stanton, White, and
Roach, the threshold question in specialty license plate cases is
not simply whether specialty plates are government or private
speech,177 but whether Johanns’s control test or the literal
speaker test governs that determination. The answer to that
question, in turn, depends on the scope of the government speech
doctrine post-Summum. If the government speech doctrine
applies broadly to government expression over which the state
has effective control, then much of Judge Martin’s criticism of the
majority opinion in Bredesen—as well as the arguments made by
the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—falls away. If
not, then the majority position properly cabined Johanns to the
compelled subsidy context, and the literal speaker test endures.
Thus, any analysis of specialty license plates now requires a
careful review of Summum.
In Summum, the Court considered whether Pleasant Grove
City could refuse to display in a park a monument containing the
Seven Aphorisms of the Summum religion when the City already
176. See id. at 390 (“I would hold that Tennessee created a forum to
encourage a diversity of viewpoints from private speakers and therefore the
Constitution requires viewpoint neutrality.”).
177. Government speech has received considerable attention over the last
few years. Given that many circuits have employed some variation of the literal
speaker test, it is not surprising that much of this literature has focused on the
literal speaker test or SCV’s mixed speech analysis. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note
25; Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571 (2011); Amy R. Lucas, Comment, Specialty License
Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government Speech and
Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971 (2008); Norton, supra note 25;
Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365 (2009);
Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech
Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 85 (2011).
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displayed a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments.178
Although directly involving religious expression in the public
sphere, the Court decided the case on First Amendment speech,
not Establishment Clause, grounds. In particular, the Court
unanimously adopted the government speech doctrine, holding
that the City could accept some facially religious monuments
while rejecting others.179 The Court confirmed what it previously
had suggested in Southworth, Rust, and Johanns—that the
government “has the right ‘to speak for itself’”180 and that when
speaking the government “‘is entitled to say what it wishes’”181
and “to select the views that it wants to express.”182 Because the
government is not regulating a forum when speaking but is
giving expression to its own views, “the government’s own
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”183 As a
speaker, the government can discriminate based on content and
viewpoint.184 To hold otherwise would be to undermine the
government’s ability to function:
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid
by public funds express a view with which he disagreed,
debate over issues of great concern to the public would be
limited to those in the private sector, and the process of
government as we know it radically transformed.185

But under Summum, what does the government have to do
to qualify for the protection of the government speech doctrine?
178. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009).
179. Id. at 481.
180. Id. at 467 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
181. Id. at 467–68 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
182. Id. at 468.
183. Id. at 467 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005)).
184. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995) (stating that, if the government is speaking, “it may make contentbased choices”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the government speaks for itself and is not regulating the
speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint . . . .”).
185. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)).
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According to the majority of circuit courts that have reached the
issue, the government is speaking for government speech doctrine
purposes only if a reasonable person would attribute the
expressive activity to the government.186 Justice Souter advocated
for this test in his concurrence in Summum and his dissent in
Johanns: “[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would
understand the expression to be government speech.”187 The
problem is that a majority of the Court has never adopted Justice
Souter’s proposed test. Instead, Summum focused on the level of
governmental control over the message conveyed: “In this case, it
is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park
represent government speech . . . because the City has ‘effectively
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”188 Under
Summum, if the government exercises effective control over the
message, it becomes the speaker and may claim the fundamental
right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to choose its own
message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”189
For specialty license plates to fall within the government
speech doctrine, a state must have sufficient control over the
selection and approval process to ensure that the government is
186. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Our
analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party.”); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853,
863 (7th Cir. 2008) (listing the relevant factors in making this determination as:
“the degree to which the message originates with the government, the degree to
which the government exercises editorial control over the message, and whether
the government or a private party communicates the message”).
187. Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It
means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is
never required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it
is affirmatively concealed from them.”).
188. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (majority opinion) (quoting Johanns, 544
U.S. at 560–61 (majority opinion)).
189. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
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sending its own message as opposed to simply facilitating the
speech of private parties. As Bredesen, on the one hand, and SCV,
Rose, Stanton, White, and Roach¸ on the other, demonstrate, the
control test and the literal speaker test give different—and
inconsistent—results in the specialty plate context.190 Thus,
whether an organization can force the government to issue a “Kill
the Sea Turtles” plate depends on whether Summum’s control
test supplants the literal speaker test espoused by Justice Souter
and several circuit courts.
III. Specialty License Plates are Government Speech if the State
Effectively Controls the Message Conveyed by Its Specialty Plates
and Has Final Approval Authority over Their Selection
The government speech–private speech distinction is critical
in the specialty plate context because how the speech is classified
is dispositive of the First Amendment challenge. If specialty
plates are government speech, then the First Amendment does
not apply: “The Free Speech Clause restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”191 A state may speak through its specialty plates and
even engage in viewpoint discrimination by offering a plate
promoting one message (“Save the Sea Turtles” or “Choose Life”)
while precluding different messages on the same topic (“Kill the
Sea Turtles” or “Respect Choice”). If specialty plates are private
speech, the First Amendment applies fully, and any restriction on
specialty plates must be, at a minimum, reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.
As the Supreme Court acknowledges in Summum, “[t]here
may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a
forum for private speech.”192 The split between and among the
circuits bears this out. Summum, though, provides a new
standard that is inconsistent with the subjective test that many
190.
191.
192.

Supra Part II.A.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
Id. at 470.
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of the circuit courts have used—the reasonable observer’s
perception of whom is speaking.193 Thus, in the wake of
Summum, the analysis of specialty plates by the Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits is wrong.
Specifically, the majority’s literal speaker test is inconsistent
with the government speech doctrine set forth in Johanns and
Summum for at least two reasons. First, unlike the four-factor
test developed in SCV, Summum and Johanns focus on the level
of control the government exercises over the speech, not on whom
a reasonable observer views as the literal speaker.194 As a
result, the nature of the specialty plate program is important.195
If states, such as Arizona and Missouri, create an administrative
procedure that authorizes all specialty plates that organizations
meeting some minimal statutorily defined criteria propose, then
the plates may be private speech. Rather than retain control over
the messages, the government permits any group meeting the
specified criteria to express its views on the subjects permitted in
that forum. If, however, states must pass legislation to authorize
a specialty plate, then the government retains greater control
over the content and approval process for each plate. Under
Summum, this difference in control makes a constitutional
difference. When a state “has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages
193. Justice Souter advocates for the literal speaker test, in part, to provide
consistency between the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause
analyses: “This reasonable observer test for governmental character is of a piece
with the one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement of religion in the
Establishment Clause cases.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J.,
concurring). The criticisms of the endorsement test apply with equal force to the
literal speaker test. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“For
the reasons expressed below, I submit that the endorsement test is flawed in its
fundamentals and unworkable in practice.”).
194. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he City has ‘effectively controlled’
the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval
authority’ over their selection.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.
550, 560 (2005) (“The message of the promotional campaigns is effectively
controlled by the Federal Government itself.”).
195. The literal speaker test does not distinguish between a specialty plate
program that requires legislative enactment and one that establishes an
administrative procedure. The literal speaker associates specialty plates with
the driver under both programs even though the government exercises
substantially different levels of control over the speech in each program.
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sent by [specialty license plates] by exercising ‘final approval
authority’ over their selection,” the plates are government
speech.196
Second, several of the circuit courts improperly attempt to
limit the government speech doctrine to cases like Rust and
Johanns where the government sponsors a specific “program” or
the speech is “‘part of a larger governmental scheme to encourage
some private activity, like beef consumption.’”197 Neither
Summum nor Johanns imposes such a “program” or “scheme”
limitation on the government speech doctrine. In fact, Summum
is inconsistent with any such requirement. The monuments in
Summum were government speech even though there was no
narrowly defined message or program at issue. As the Court
explained, the park included fifteen permanent displays, at least
eleven of which were donated by private groups or individuals,
including “an historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first fire
station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten Commandments
monument.”198 Such a collection of monuments does not
constitute a government program like the family planning
services in Rust v. Sullivan199 or the ad campaign in Johanns, yet
the Court held that the monuments were government speech
nonetheless.200

196. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.
197. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Andy G. Olree, Specialty License Plates: Look Who’s Talking in the
Sixth Circuit, 68 ALA. LAW. 213, 214 (2007)); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v.
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he State has created a limited
(license plate) forum for expression, not a government program such as one, for
example, that would be carried out through a school, museum, or clinic.”).
198. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465 (2008).
199. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting the absurd
consequences of imposing viewpoint discrimination on government programs).
200. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (“[I]t is clear that the monuments in
Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government speech.”).
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A. Post-Summum, the Level of Government Control over the
Content of the Message Determines Whether the Government is
Speaking, Not the Identity of the “Literal Speaker” as Determined
by a Reasonable Third Party Observer
Although the SCV test purports to have four factors, the
majority of circuit courts, following pre-Summum decisions from
lower federal courts, takes the identity of the literal speaker as
determined by a third party observer to be critical in the
specialty plate context. As Judge Michael noted in Rose, “[N]o one
who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase
‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a
pro-life viewpoint. The literal speaker of the Choose Life message
on the specialty plate therefore appears to be the vehicle
owner, not the State.”201 Recognizing the central role the literal
speaker prong plays in SCV and Rose, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the test “boils down to one key question: whether,
under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed
observer would consider the speaker to be the government or a
private party.”202 The Seventh Circuit reached the same result in
White.203
The problem is that the Supreme Court previously
considered and rejected the “literal speaker” test. In a section of
Johanns that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits did not discuss,
the
majority
denied
the
respondents’
claim
that
“[c]ommunications cannot be ‘government speech,’ . . . if they
are attributed to someone other than the government.”204
Although many who viewed the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” ads
may not have known the government created the campaign, the
Court held that the ads were still government speech: “[T]he
201. Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (emphasis added).
202. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009).
203. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008)
(adopting the SCV factors but explaining that these factors “can be distilled
(and simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the
circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party”).
204. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564–65 (2005)
(“Since neither the Beef Act nor the Beef Order requires attribution, neither can
be the cause of any possible First Amendment harm.”).
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correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the
Government is speaking, but on the compelled assessment’s
purported interference with respondents’ First Amendment
rights.”205 The majority acknowledged that the identity of the
speaker might be relevant to an as-applied compelled speech
challenge, which would force respondents to show “that
individual beef advertisements were attributed to [them].”206
Because the beef producers were forced to subsidize the
government’s speech, the attribution of that speech to a specific
beef producer might support a compelled speech claim.207 In
Johanns, though, there was no evidence of attribution to support
an as-applied challenge, the only evidence in the record being one
sentence that stated: “an employee of one of the respondent
associations said he did not think the beef promotions would be
attributed to his group.”208 Because the evidence did not show
that there had been any attribution, there was no compelled
speech and, consequently, no basis for an as-applied challenge.209
Justice Souter advanced the same test for government
speech in his Johanns dissent: “It means nothing that
Government officials control the message if that fact is never
required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let
alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them.”210 In Summum,
Justice Souter argued, consistent with his dissent in Johanns,
that the identity requirement applied to all government speech,
not just government speech in the compelled subsidy context of
Johanns: “[T]he government should lose [the protection of the
government speech doctrine] when the character of the speech is
205. Id. at 564 n.7.
206. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
207. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas explained that, in his view, any
unwanted association—regardless of the source of funding—would support a
compelled speech claim: “The government may not, consistent with the First
Amendment, associate individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by
attributing an unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals
fund the speech, and whether or not the message is under the government’s
control.” Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 565–66 (majority opinion).
209. See id. (discussing the lack of basis for an as-applied challenge).
210. Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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at issue and its governmental nature has not been made clear.”211
Because (i) the majority in Johanns expressly rejected the
literal speaker test advanced by the respondents and Justice
Souter212 and (ii) no other Justice joined Justice Souter’s
Summum concurrence, Johanns precludes courts from limiting
the government speech doctrine to situations in which a
reasonable observer would know that the government is
speaking.213
Instead of considering who might appear to be speaking, the
Johanns Court focused exclusively on the government’s control
over the message when deciding whether the beef advertisements
were government speech.214 Although a viewer reasonably might
have thought the government was speaking, the advertisements
in Johanns were government speech because the “message set
out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message
established by the Federal Government” and because the
government “exercises final approval authority over every word
used in every promotional campaign.”215 In his dissent, Justice
Souter confirmed that the Johanns majority proffered a “control”
test for government speech instead of considering whether a
reasonable observer would identify the government as the
speaker: “The Court takes the view that because Congress
authorized this scheme and the Government controls (or at least
has veto on) the content of the beef ads, the need for democratic
accountability has been satisfied.”216 Justice Souter lamented
that the majority applied the government speech doctrine even
though the government’s control over the message was not
“made apparent to those who get the message.”217 Thus,
211. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 485 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
212. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005)
(“But the correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the
Government is speaking . . . .”).
213. See id. (refusing to limit the government speech doctrine to situations
where the third parties know that the government is speaking).
214. See id. at 560–62 (discussing the government’s complete control over
the message).
215. Id. at 560–61 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217. Id. In the Rose opinion, Judge Michael anticipated Justice Souter’s
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Justice Souter expressly acknowledged that the majority rejected
his argument—that the government speech doctrine should
apply only if a third party would understand the government to
be the speaker—in favor of the “control” test that finds
government speech where “Congress authorized this scheme and
the Government controls (or at least has a veto on) the content
of the beef ads.”218
Moreover, any attempt to limit Johanns to the compelled
subsidy context is unavailing in light of Summum.219 To
determine whether the government is speaking, Summum
followed Johanns and evaluated the level of control that the
government exercised over the speech.220 In section IV of the
opinion, the Court explained “it is clear that the monuments . . .
represent government speech” because “the City has ‘effectively
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”221 Given
that the government decided which monuments “it wants to
display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park,” the message
about its image was government speech.222

concern with the identity of the literal speaker. Specifically, Judge Michael
rejected a government “control” test because “this argument overlooks the fact
that continuing transparency is essential to accountability” and “the identity of
the speaker of the Choose Life message is likely to be unclear to viewers of the
license plate.” Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798–99
(4th Cir. 2004).
218. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
219. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir. 2006)
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“The government speech doctrine, as it is used in
Johanns, is more appropriately utilized in the compelled subsidy context, where
who is speaking is determinative, and if it is the government, consistent with its
broad taxing authority, that speech is immune from First Amendment
challenge.”). Contrary to Judge Martin’s suggestion, Johanns—at least when
read in conjunction with Summum—is “a watershed First Amendment case”
and not simply “a watershed compelled subsidy case.” Id. at 387 n.12.
220. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2009)
(describing the level of control that the government exercised over the
monuments).
221. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
222. Id. at 473.
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B. Wooley Precluded the Government’s Compelling Speech
Through Standard Issue Plates but Did Not Address Whether
Specialty Plates Are Government Speech or Private Speech
The Court’s rejection of the literal speaker test helps to
illustrate why Wooley v. Maynard223 does not support the Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ conclusions that specialty
plates are private speech.224 In White, the Seventh Circuit
invoked Wooley to show that specialty plates are not government
speech: “[I]f messages on license plates implicated no privatespeech interests at all, then Wooley (among other cases) would
have come out differently.”225 Prior to Summum, this rigid
separation between a government message and a private message
may have been reasonable. Post-Summum, however, it is a false
dichotomy.226 Under Summum and Johanns, a third party’s
perception (or misperception) that a vehicle owner is conveying a
message through a license plate may be relevant to a compelled
speech claim,227 but it does not determine whether the
government is speaking. Under Summum, a driver may seek to
convey a message by displaying a specialty plate just as a
monument donor or a painter may seek to convey a message
through her donation and artwork, respectively.228 The
government speech doctrine, though, enables the government to
speak and convey its own message through the license plate,
monument, or artwork: “the thoughts or sentiments expressed by
223. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
224. Infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text.
225. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has indicated [in
Wooley] that license plates, even when owned by the government, implicate
private speech interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to
the driver or owner of the vehicle.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)).
226. See infra notes 227–40 and accompanying text (analyzing the difficulty
of separating government and private messages).
227. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 568 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing compelled speech claims).
228. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2009)
(discussing government- and privately financed and donated monuments that
the government accepts and displays to the public on government property).
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a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”229
In Wooley, the Court found that the message “Live Free or
Die” was the government’s message and that the statute required
the Maynards to “use their private property as a ‘mobile
billboard’ for the state’s ideological message—or suffer a
penalty.”230 Although an observer might attribute a message to
the driver, the government violated the First Amendment
because it controlled the license plate process (from owning the
license plate to selecting the message) and forced citizens to carry
its message.231 The constitutional violation in Wooley, therefore,
was that the government compelled the Maynards to express the
government’s message.232
In the specialty plate context, the circuit courts do not—and
cannot—rely on the Supreme Court’s compelled speech cases
because states do not require anyone to purchase and display
specialty plates.233 Wooley did not hold that the message on the
New Hampshire license plate was the message of the Maynards;
rather, the Court maintained that a private individual cannot be
forced to involuntarily carry a government message.234 The Court
did not suggest that the plate involved private speech or
discriminated against opposing viewpoints and, therefore, did not
229. Id. at 476; see also id. at 476 n.5 (“Museums display works of art that
express many different sentiments, and the significance of a donated work of art
to its creator or donor may differ markedly from a museum’s reasons for
accepting and displaying the work.”).
230. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (emphasis added).
231. See id. (“Here . . . we are faced with a state measure which forces an
individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to [the government’s] ideological point of view [that the individual]
finds unacceptable.”).
232. See id. (discussing how the “State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control’” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))).
233. License Plates & Placards, DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
www.dmv.org/license-plates.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (concluding that the State of New
Hampshire may not require the Maynards to display the state motto on their
license plates).
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require New Hampshire to stop using (or even to modify) the
“Live Free or Die” plate.235 Accordingly, the Court struck down
only the part of the statute that prohibited covering up the motto
because that provision “requires that [the Maynards] use their
private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message.”236 Unlike the standard issue plate in Wooley, states
do not compel anyone to purchase and display specialty license
plates. Instead, motorists consent to be “the courier for [the
government’s] message.”237 Thus, Wooley implicitly acknowledges
what Summum subsequently confirms—that the government can
speak for itself even though private parties may also engage in
speech activity.238 Where, as in Wooley, the government compels
others to speak, the First Amendment prevents such coercion.239
But the government is still permitted to speak through drivers
who are willing to keep Live Free or Die uncovered on their
standard issue plates.240
In fact, if Wooley applies at all, it supports the argument of
states requiring legislative approval of specialty plates that such
plates are government speech. If the government is speaking,
then private citizens do not have a heckler’s veto. Private citizens
cannot compel the government to carry their desired message any
more than the government can force motorists—like the
Maynards in Wooley—to carry its preferred message. That is,

235. See id. at 713 (defining the issue as whether the state may
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of a
state message).
236. Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 717.
238. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“A
government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a
government-controlled message.”).
239. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different
from the majority and refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands
[by requiring drivers to display the Live Free or Die license plates], an idea they
find morally objectionable.”).
240. See id. at 713 (holding that the government cannot require drivers to
keep the “Live Free or Die” uncovered, but not extending the ruling to prohibit
the slogan on the standard issue plates).
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when speaking, the government “may also decide ‘what not to
say.’”241
But Wooley does not apply.242 Unlike the “Live Free or Die”
plate in Wooley, specialty plates “are privately financed and
donated [to] government[s] . . . for public display on government
[property],” namely the state-owned license plate.243 Motorists
voluntarily choose to display the state’s message on their vehicles
and are willing to pay for the opportunity to do so. In SCV, the
Fourth Circuit suggests that it is “curious” that, if the
government were speaking, the government would require a
commitment from a certain number of drivers before making its
message available through a specialty plate.244 The additional
fee suggests to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that the “purpose”
of the specialty plate program is to raise revenue, not to
promulgate a government-controlled message.245 Thus, on this
view, the government’s purpose is to create a forum for private
speech from which it secures additional revenue. The government
is not seeking to “subsidiz[e] the promulgation of governmentchosen messages”246 like it did through the subsidy program in
Rust.247 Consequently, specialty plates are not government
speech for these circuits.
241. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S.
1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
242. Infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
243. Summum, 555 U.S. at 461.
244. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 620 (4th Cir. 2002) (“If the General Assembly
intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed collection of a
designated amount of money from private persons before its ‘speech’ is
triggered.”).
245. See id. at 620 (“It is not the case, in other words, that the special plate
program only incidentally produces revenue for the Commonwealth. The very
structure of the program ensures that only special plate messages popular
enough among private individuals to produce a certain amount of revenue will
be expressed.”); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“The revenue raising purpose of the Arizona special organization plate program
supports a finding of private speech.”).
246. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 620 n.8.
247. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81 (1991) (describing the Title
X subsidy program that promulgated government messages about family
planning).
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As Summum demonstrates, though, the majority’s reliance
on the extra fee requirement is misplaced. “By accepting
monuments that are privately funded or donated, government
entities save tax dollars and are able to acquire monuments that
they could not have afforded to fund on their own.”248 The
additional charge for a specialty plate ensures that the costs of
production and distribution are covered before manufacturing
the plate (while in many states raising money for specific
causes that the states support). Illinois’s specialty plate statute
expressly makes this point:
The Secretary of State shall not issue a series of special plates
unless applications . . . have been received for 10,000 plates of
that series; except that the Secretary of State may prescribe
some other required number of applications if that number is
sufficient to pay for the total cost of designing, manufacturing
and issuing the special license plate.249

In this way, states can promote a variety of messages that they
might not otherwise have the resources to fund. In addition, the
state is able to raise additional funds to support groups with
activities that are consistent with the states’ chosen messages.
The fact that individuals are willing to pay for the privilege
of carrying the government’s message (or of displaying that
message for their own purposes) does not convert government
speech into private speech.250 As the Court explained in
Summum, “[a] government entity may exercise this same
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from
private sources for the purpose of delivering a government248. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009).
249. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
250. The Fourth Circuit invoked Rosenberger to support its claim that
specialty plate programs create fora in which the government cannot
discriminate based on viewpoint: “‘When the government targets . . . particular
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is
all the more blatant.’” Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786,
797 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Rosenberger is inapplicable, however, because in that
case, unlike the specialty plate context, the government expressly disclaimed
that it was speaking. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. As the University of Virginia
put it, student groups were “not the University’s agents, [were] not subject to its
control, and [were] not its responsibility.” Id.
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controlled message.”251 That third-party volunteers agree with
the state’s message and are willing to assist the state in getting
out its message does not mean the state has created a forum for
private speech; rather, it demonstrates that the state has adopted
a message that appeals to some segment of its population: “There
is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rust or Johanns
that implies that the government has less right to control
expressions of its policies when it relies on unpaid private
people. No constitutionally significant distinction exists between
volunteer disseminators and paid disseminators.”252
Under Rust, a state’s specialty plate program would be
constitutional if the state paid vehicle owners to carry a “Choose
Life” or “Save the Sea Turtles” plate. Under Summum, the
constitutional analysis is the same where those same vehicle
owners volunteer—or agree to pay more—to carry the
government’s message.253 Nor is this surprising given that the
government speech doctrine is triggered by the level of
government control over the message and not the source of the
funding for that message. In the monument context, the
government can intend to send—and actually send—a message
through its monuments even though it is not able or willing to
expend its own funds to do so.254 For example, a city might want
to erect a monument to honor its veterans but may be unwilling
or unable to pay for the monument. If private citizens raise
sufficient funds and submit a design that is acceptable to the city,
the city is free to accept and display that monument without
losing the protection of the government speech doctrine: “Indeed,
when a privately donated memorial is funded by many small
donations, the donors themselves may differ in their
interpretation of the monument’s significance. By accepting such
251. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468; see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n,
544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (explaining that where the government controls the
message, “it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources”).
252. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006).
253. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (drawing no distinction between private
and public funding of speech controlled by the government).
254. See id. at 474 (“The City’s actions . . . signify[] to all Park visitors that
the City intends the [privately funded] monument to speak on its behalf.”).
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a monument, a government entity does not necessarily endorse
the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in the
monument.”255 Rather, the city “select[s] those monuments that it
wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the
City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park.”256
The same is true for specialty license plates. Under the
Supreme Court’s government speech cases, organizations and
individuals can propose specialty plates for their own reasons.257
If legislation is required to approve the plate, the state exercises
effective control and veto power over the message and, therefore,
can authorize specialty plates to convey its intended message.258
Under Johanns and Summum, the government has this authority
even though (reasonable) third parties might not identify the
government as the speaker (and thereby incorrectly attribute no
message to the government) or misunderstand the government’s
intended message.259 Consequently, the identity of the speaker as
perceived by a third party is the wrong lens through which to
see if the message is government or private speech.
A quick review of Summum might provide support for the
literal speaker test. The Court identifies public accountability as
one of the main checks on government speech: “a government
entity is ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political
process for its advocacy.’”260 As the Fourth Circuit explained in
SCV, “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore
accountable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger
ordinarily involved in governmental viewpoint-based choices is
not present.”261 To hold the government accountable, so the
255. Id. at 476–77.
256. Id. at 473.
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of
organizations and individuals to propose specialty license plates in Illinois).
258. See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text (discussing legislation
about specialty plates).
259. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009)
(discussing the difficulties of identifying a monument’s exact message and
speaker).
260. Id. at 468 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
261. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Planned Parenthood of S.C.
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argument goes, the electorate must be able to know that the
government is speaking.262 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Rose,
“the State’s advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may not be readily
apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate, and this
insulates the State’s advocacy from electoral accountability.”263
Consequently, in the absence of Johanns and the rest of the
Summum decision, the literal speaker test is a facially
plausible—even reasonable—way to demarcate government
speech from private speech. As discussed above, however,
Johanns and Summum prohibit courts from limiting the
government speech doctrine to situations in which a reasonable
observer would know that the government is speaking.264 After
all, in Johanns, a reasonable observer would have thought that a
third party—and not the government—was speaking.265
Moreover, Wooley does not alter the analysis. Specialty plates do
not implicate compelled speech; rather, they display to the world
a government message through volunteers who pay for the
privilege to carry that message.
C. The Literal Speaker Test Fails to Account For the Fact that
Government Speech May Have Many Meanings to Many
Different People
Given Johann’s and Summum’s emphasis on the
government’s control over the message,266 the literal speaker test
Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795–96 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The government speech
doctrine was not intended to authorize cloaked advocacy that allows the State to
promote an idea without being accountable to the political process.”).
262. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618 (discussing the need
to know when the government is “speaking”).
263. Rose, 361 F.3d at 795.
264. Supra Part III.A.
265. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006)
Johanns also says that a government-crafted message is government
speech even if the government does not explicitly credit itself as the
speaker. . . . In contrast, the medium in this case, a governmentissued license plate that every reasonable person knows to be
government-issued, a fortiori conveys a government message.
266. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)
(emphasizing the government’s control over the message); Johanns v. Livestock
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concentrates on the wrong person in the communicative
process—the listener instead of the government speaker. This
shift in focus undermines the government’s ability to say what it
wants. Whenever a reasonable observer improperly interprets a
specialty plate as conveying a message on behalf of the driver,
the government loses its right to regulate the speech on its
specialty plates. What the literal speaker test overlooks is the
fact that government speech may convey more than one
message: “the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a
government entity that accepts and displays [a monument]
may be quite different from those of either its creator or its
donor.”267 Under Summum, the government does not lose the
protection of the government speech doctrine simply because a
private person assists the government in creating or
disseminating its message and, at the same time, seeks to engage
in expressive activity.268 “When, as here, the government sets the
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the governmentspeech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from
nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages.”269
Individuals and organizations may donate monuments to
convey “specific messages” that they want to communicate to
others.270 The key is that the government can adopt such
monuments for its own purposes.271 If a state has effective control
over the speech—in other words, sets the overall message and
approves every word conveyed—the speech is government
speech.272 This is true, even though the individuals who proposed
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005) (same).
267. Summum, 555 U.S. at 476.
268. See id. at 468 (“A government entity may exercise this same freedom to
express its views when it receives assistance from private sources for the
purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”).
269. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
270. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 464 (giving an example of a private group
donating monuments to place in a city park).
271. See id. at 473–74 (providing an example of a city taking ownership of a
privately donated monument displayed in the city’s park).
272. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (giving one
example of government speech).
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the specialty license plate may intend to send their own, different
message. Moreover, reasonable observers may interpret such
monuments in even more and varied ways: “Even when a
monument features the written word, the monument may be
intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by
different observers, in a variety of ways.”273
For example, in Van Orden v. Perry,274 the Fraternal Order of
Eagles commissioned a Ten Commandments monument to draw
attention to child delinquency.275 The State of Texas adopted the
monument to convey its own message: “Texas has treated its
Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands
in the State’s political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten
Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance,
partaking of both religion and government.”276 Although Texas
did not have a statutorily prescribed program, it had approved
“17 monuments and 21 historical markers commemorating the
‘people, ideals, and events that compose Texan identity.’”277 These
thirty-eight monuments and markers were designed and donated
by various groups, but the government selected those that
conveyed the message that the government wanted to send about
Texas political and legal history.278 Reasonable observers could
interpret the Fraternal Order of Eagles monument as sending
various messages, including a religious message.279 Yet, despite
there being a variety of possible interpretations of the

273. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474 (2009).
274. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
275. Id. at 681–82.
276. Id. at 691–92.
277. Id. at 681.
278. See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[The setting and monuments]
communicate[] to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles,
illustrating a relation between ethics and law that the State’s citizens,
historically speaking, have endorsed.”).
279. See id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
In choosing to display this version of the Commandments, Texas tells
the observer that the State supports this side of the doctrinal
religious debate. The reasonable observer, after all, has no way of
knowing that this text was the product of compromise, or that there is
a rationale of any kind for the text’s selection.
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monument,280 for First Amendment purposes the monuments
were government speech even though Texas did not adopt each
monument as part of a specific program like Title X (Rust)281 or
beef advertisements (Johanns).282
The same analysis applies in the specialty license plate
context. Through their specialty plate programs, states select
those specialty plates “that portray what [government
decisionmakers] view as appropriate for the [state], taking into
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and
local culture.”283 States that retain effective control over their
specialty plates adopt only those specialty plates that convey
something about the states that their legislatures think is
appropriate for “presenting the image of the [state] that it wishes
to project to all who” see the specialty license plates—which,
given the mobility of people today, are seen in States across the
country.284 By approving many different plates, states convey a
message about the things that make it unique and special—from
the diversity of its citizens’ interests and their educational
backgrounds to the causes that the state supports: organ
donation, military service, wildlife conservation, proper
treatment of animals, education (for example, collegiate plates,
Kids First), civic groups (for example, Kiwanis, Knights of
Columbus, Oasis Temple, and Lion’s Club), sports (for example,
professional football, basketball, and hockey as well as NASCAR
plates), wildlife conservation (for example, Save the Sea Turtles,
Coastal Federation, State Parks, Trout Unlimited), recreational
opportunities (for example, golf, tennis, skiing, ocean, and
mountains), and the arts.285
280. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474–75 (2009)
(considering the numerous possible messages that observers might attribute to
the Greco-Roman mosaic of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New York
City’s Central Park).
281. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81 (1991) (describing the Title
X subsidy program adopted by the government).
282. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005)
(describing the beef advertisement program as effectively controlled by the
government).
283. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.
284. Id. at 473.
285. See, e.g., Charitable & Collegiate Plates, DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES: ST.
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At least under specialty plate programs that require
legislative approval, states retain power over the message on
each plate by “exercis[ing] editorial control over [proposed
specialty plates] through prior submission requirements, design
input, requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative
approvals of specific content proposals.”286 The specialty plates,
therefore, are government speech: “The [specialty plates] that
are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the
effect of conveying a government message, and they thus
constitute government speech.”287 As a result, under Johanns and
Summum,288 specialty plates are exempt from scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
D. States Can Invoke the Government Speech Doctrine Even if
Their Specialty Plate Programs Do Not Promulgate a Narrowly
Defined Program or Message
The circuit courts that take specialty plates to be private
speech try to avoid this result by arguing that specialty plates do
not qualify as the type of “program” protected by the government
speech doctrine: “Thus, because South Carolina has not created a
program ‘of the kind recognized in Rust,’ it cannot justify the Act
as ‘necessary to define the scope and contours’ of the license plate
scheme.”289 These circuit courts impermissibly seek to limit the
government speech doctrine to speech directed at a specific,
narrowly defined program or message. On this view, Rust is a
government speech case involving a federal program that
promoted family planning but not abortion services.290 The
NEV., www.dmvnv.com/platescharitable.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013)
(listing several charitable and collegiate causes and plates available in the State
of Nevada) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
286. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).
287. Id.
288. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005)
(affording no basis to a First Amendment challenge); Summum, 555 U.S. at 481
(same).
289. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001)).
290. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (describing the Title
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government could require funding recipients to use the money
only for the specific program set forth in Title X.291 Similarly,
Johanns involved government speech because the “Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner” campaign was created as part of a statutorily
prescribed program to promote the marketing and consumption of
beef products.292 Because specialty plate programs allegedly do
not convey a specific message on behalf of the states, they do not
qualify as government speech.
The attempt to restrict government speech to narrowly
defined programs fails for at least two reasons. First, a “specific
program” requirement is inconsistent with Summum.293 In
Summum, the government did not espouse a specific message
along the lines of the programs in Rust or Johanns.294 Second,
contrary to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ suggestion,295 a
state does not forfeit its role as speaker simply by offering a
variety of specialty plates. As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged in
Bredesen, “there is nothing implausible about the notion that
Tennessee would use its license plate program to convey
messages regarding over one hundred groups, ideologies,
activities, and colleges. Government in this age is large and
involved in practically every aspect of life.”296 States can use
their specialty plate programs to convey an overall image of
the state by highlighting different aspects of the state that the
X subsidy program that promulgated government messages about family
planning programs that did not include abortion).
291. See id. (“[Title X] provides that ‘[n]one of the funds appropriated under
this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2012))).
292. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554 (describing the promotional projects
authorized by the Beef Act including the familiar trademarked slogan “Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner”).
293. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–86 (2009)
(discussing the city’s right to select monuments for a public park without ever
mentioning a “specific program” requirement).
294. See id. at 477 (noting that the message conveyed by a monument may
evolve over time).
295. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (“With
more than 200 specialty plates available to Missouri vehicle owners, a
reasonable observer could not think that the State of Missouri communicates all
those messages.”).
296. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).
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legislature wants to celebrate. A state need not subsidize a
specific program (such as Title X in Rust)297 or promulgate a
narrowly defined message (such as “Beef. It’s What’s for
Dinner”)298 to fall within the government speech doctrine. After
all, in Summum, the city had a wide range of monuments—for
example, a wishing well, September 11 monument, fire station,
granary, and the Ten Commandments monument—yet retained
the protection of the government speech doctrine.299 The central
point for the Court was that the “City has selected those
monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent
the Park.”300
The Court never has imposed a narrow “program”
requirement under the government speech doctrine even though
the government certainly can and does speak through specific
programs. This is apparent from Hurley.301 In Hurley, a group of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants
sought to march as a group in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day
parade.302 After the private organizers of the parade denied their
request, the group sued, contending that the exclusion of the
group violated Massachusetts’s public accommodation law.303 A
unanimous Court held that the First Amendment protected the
organizers’ right to exclude a group that would “impart[] a
message the organizers do not wish to convey.”304 Given that
parades are expressive activities, the organizers could claim the
“fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that
a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message.”305 And this is true even if the speaker does not convey
297. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (describing the
government subsidized Title X program).
298. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555 (2005).
299. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009).
300. Id. at 473.
301. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
302. See id. at 572 (“[T]he disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its
own parade unit carrying its own banner.”).
303. See id. at 572–73 (discussing GLIB’s grounds for the litigation).
304. Id. at 559.
305. Id. at 573.
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a particularized message: “A speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices,
or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as
the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”306 The parade
organizers in Hurley were “rather lenient in admitting
participants.”307 But they still were protected by the First
Amendment because “a narrow, succinctly articulated message is
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ would never
reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll.”308
Like the parade organizers in Hurley, states select those
specialty plates that taken together convey a message about each
state. And “since every participating unit affects the message
conveyed,” those who have messages that are not approved
cannot “requir[e states] to alter the expressive content of their
[program].”309 When speaking, states retain the right to say what
they want on certain topics and to remain silent on others:
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive
units of the parade from potential participants, and though the
score may not produce a particularized message, each
contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports with
what merits celebration on that day. Even if this view gives
the Council credit for a more considered judgment than it
actively made, the Council clearly decided to exclude a
message it did not like from the communication it chose to
make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private
speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject
while remaining silent on another.310

As Summum confirms, under the government speech doctrine a
state has “the choice . . . not to propound a particular point of
view,”311 which means it can exclude viewpoints that conflict with
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 569.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
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its vision of “what merits celebration”312 about the state.313 The
fact that a state adopts “expressive units” (in other words,
particular specialty plates that individuals or groups propose and
pay for) relating to the people, history, sports, and natural beauty
of that state does not cause it to lose the protection of the
government speech doctrine. As the Court explains in Johanns,
“[w]hen, as here, the government sets the overall message to be
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” a
state does not relinquish First Amendment protection “merely
because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in
developing specific messages.”314 Thus, because states, like the
parade organizers in Hurley, (i) establish the message and
(ii) have effective control over the content and dissemination of
the message, states’ specialty plate programs constitute
government speech.315
Furthermore, the fact that some (reasonable) observers may
attribute a message—“Save the Sea Turtles,” “Choose Life,”
“Tobacco Heritage,” or any other specialty plate—to the vehicle
owner and not the state does not move the state outside the
government speech doctrine. Although many (perhaps most)
viewers thought a private beef association sponsored the “Beef.
It’s What’s for Dinner” campaign, the speech still was

312. Id. at 574.
313. See id. at 573–74 (stating that the point of “this general rule, that the
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, . . . is to shield just those choices of
content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful”).
314. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (emphasis
added); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment
protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item
featured in the communication.”).
315. Even in the funding context, the Court does not limit the government
speech doctrine to narrowly defined programs. As Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez explains, the government can avail itself of the government speech
doctrine whenever it is speaking, not only when it decides to use private
speakers to advance specific programs: “We have said that viewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is
itself the speaker . . . or in instances, like Rust, in which the government ‘used
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own
programs.’” 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citation omitted).
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government speech.316 Similarly, the government is speaking
through its specialty plates even though “[t]hose who see the
Choose Life plate displayed on vehicles, and fail to see a
comparable pro-choice plate, are likely to assume that the
presence of one plate and the absence of another are the result of
popular choice.”317 States, such as North Carolina, Missouri, and
Texas, may offer more than 100 specialty plates but that does
not change the fact that the state controls the entire process for
each specialty plate and selects only those plates “that portray
what they view as appropriate for” each state.318 By approving
many different plates, these states send a message about the
things they want to celebrate about their state and citizens—be
that education, sports, recreation, civic organizations, military
service, arts, environmental issues, and the list goes on.
In addition, Summum’s recognition that those who display or
view the government’s speech may interpret that message
differently undermines Judge Martin’s claim in his Bredesen
dissent that Tennessee’s specialty plate program promotes speech
that appears difficult, if not impossible, to attribute to the
state.319 To use Judge Martin’s example, Tennessee offers
specialty plates with the emblems of a variety of universities and
colleges, including the University of Tennessee and the
University of Florida.320 These school specialty plates enable
motorists to show their pride in or support for particular schools.
Contrary to Judge Martin’s claim, though, these college plates
do not send inconsistent messages. In offering a variety of
school license plates, Tennessee does not advocate one school
over another, even though individuals choosing a specific

316. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564–65 (holding that the slogan is
government speech even though viewers may have attributed the slogan to
private companies).
317. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir.
2004)
318. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).
319. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 382 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
320. See id. at 382 n.5 (listing the various universities and organizations
that have specialty plates in Tennessee).
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college plate might do so.321 Rather, by approving specialty
plates for many colleges and universities, Tennessee conveys a
message about its diverse, well-educated citizens and, at the
same time, champions the various educational opportunities that
Tennessee offers its citizens.322 That a third party might see a
Florida specialty plate and think the vehicle owner likes
Florida does not change the fact that the state formally
adopted the plate to send its own, albeit different, message
about Tennessee—that Tennessee has well-educated citizens and
is proud of its various institutions of higher learning.
Under Johanns and Summum, states may convey their
desired messages—“Choose Life” or “Save the Sea Turtles”—if
they have “effective[] control[]” and “final approval authority”
over the content and selection of specialty license plates.323
States that require statutory action for specialty plates have
such control over the images and wording that appear on their
specialty plates.324 And, just as the legislatures can create new
specialty plates through statute, they can revoke or amend any
specialty plate by passing new legislation. Thus, these states
have the same level of control over specialty plates that local
governments exercise over monument selection, “generally
exercis[ing] editorial control over [specialty plates] through prior
submission requirements, design input, requested modifications,
321. Under the literal speaker test adopted by several circuit courts, the
purpose of the specialty plate program is to permit private expression in a
designated forum. See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir.
2008) (noting that the primary function specialty plates serve is the opportunity
for citizens to identify themselves with particular messages).
322. See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 382 n.5 (noting that the legislature only
allows specialty license plates that serve the community and contribute to the
welfare of others).
323. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005).
324. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 301.2999 (2012) (noting that the “director of
revenue shall not authorize the manufacture” of specialty license plates unless
certain conditions are met); S.C. CODE REG. 56-3-8000(F) (2012) (“The
department may alter, modify, or refuse to produce any special license plate that
it deems offensive or fails to meet community standards.”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 504.008 (West 2012) (noting that “an application for specialty license
plates must be submitted in the manner” specified by the department); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-725 (2011) (“No series of special license plates shall be
created . . . except as authorized in this article.”).
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written criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content
proposals.”325 The First Amendment, therefore, protects the
states’ right to issue a “Save the Sea Turtles” or “Choose Life”
plate without offering plates that express alternative
viewpoints.326
IV. The Literal Speaker Test Also Violates Summum Because it
Forces States to Either Allow a Cacophony of Speech with
Which They Disagree, or to Terminate Their Specialty Plate
Programs Altogether
Given that most of the circuit courts decided their
specialty license plate cases pre-Summum, they did not have
the opportunity to consider an independent basis for the
Court’s decision.327 In a section of Summum that has received
scarce attention to date, the Court states that where “public
forum principles . . . are out of place in the context of [a] case,”
it will not apply its forum doctrine.328 The Court has applied its
forum doctrine in situations in which “government-owned
property or a government program was capable of
accommodating a large number of public speakers without
defeating the essential function of the land or the program.”329
Thus, a forum analysis is appropriate for speeches and parades
in parks, the Combined Federal Campaign,330 a student
325. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); see also
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560 (“The message set out in the beef promotions is from
beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government.”).
326. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995) (“Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is
forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced,
the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”).
327. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Conti, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370
(E.D.N.C. 2012) (detailing the new interpretation the Supreme Court provided
in “its latest opinion concerning government speech”).
328. Summum, 555 U.S. at 478; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n,
539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (“The public forum principles on which the District
Court relied . . . are out of place in the context of this case.” (citation omitted)).
329. Summum, 555 U.S. at 478.
330. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
804–05 (1985) (determining whether a charity drive aimed at federal employees
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activity fund at a university,331 meetings in public buildings,332
and a school’s internal mail facility.333
But this analysis does not govern monuments in public
parks. In Summum, the park could “accommodate only a limited
number of permanent monuments” given its size.334 While a park
can host many speakers and demonstrations over time, it cannot
display an unlimited number of monuments. Space runs out
because “monuments . . . endure.”335 The Court’s concern with
spatial limitations may, at first glance, suggest that the forum
analysis should apply in the specialty plate context. Specialty
plates can accommodate a large variety of special interest
messages, as evidenced by states’ offering hundreds of such plates
to vehicle owners.336 Although this argument has facial appeal,
the Court expressly stated that its forum analysis does not apply
when the proffered private speech would undermine the
government’s proposed message regardless of whether that
speech is undertaken through government-owned property or a
government-sponsored program.337 Where, as in a specialty plate
was a public forum by applying forum analysis).
331. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
825 (1995) (concluding that the denial of monetary disbursements to certain
student groups amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
332. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1981) (noting that an
open forum in a public university does not confer the imprimatur of state
approval of particular religious groups).
333. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39,
46–47 (1983) (determining that public property not traditionally a public forum
may be reserved by the state for its intended purposes as long as the speech
regulations are reasonable).
334. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009).
335. Id.
336. In American Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Conti, now pending in the
Fourth Circuit, the district court attempted to distinguish specialty plates from
monuments in public parks because the latter are subject to spatial limitations
while the former are not: “The specialty license plate program—which already
has demonstrated its ability to accommodate a large variety of special interest
messages—is wholly different from a public park which can only accommodate a
limited number of monuments.” 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 n.4 (E.D.N.C. 2012),
argued sub nom., Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tata, No. 13–1030 (4th
Cir. Oct. 30, 2013).
337. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473, 480 (noting that the city selected the
monuments it wanted to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the
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program, the private speech would interfere with the government
program (or the use of government property for its expressive
purposes), the forum analysis does not apply.338
Stated differently, public forum principles are out of place
where public access would defeat the essential function of a
government program by forcing the government to send messages
that conflict with its chosen message.339 Thus, even if there was
room for the Summum monument in the Pleasant Grove City
park, the government could decline it—and any other
monument—if the government determined that the monument
conflicted with the government’s intended message.340 Otherwise,
“[e]very jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial
may be asked to provide equal treatment for a donated
monument questioning the cause for which the veterans
fought.”341
The same problem arises if courts apply the Court’s forum
analysis to specialty plate programs. The literal speaker test,
which takes specialty plates to be private speech in a designated
limited forum, does not provide any limiting principle to
constrain the number and type of specialty plates that a state
could be forced to offer: “If the government entities must
maintain viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated
monuments, they must . . . ‘brace themselves for an influx of
clutter.’”342 Instead, states are required to accept all viewpoints

city that it wished to show, and that, generally, forum analysis does not apply in
such a case).
338. See id. (noting that generally, forum analysis does not apply to the
installation of permanent monuments on public property).
339. See id. at 478 (stating that public forum principles are out of place in
the context of the case).
340. See id. at 472 (“The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant
to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus
constitute government speech.”).
341. Id. at 480. As the Court repeatedly states in Summum, local
governments can “select the monuments that portray what they view as
appropriate for the place in question,” id. at 472, not simply because space is
limited but also because the government has the right to send its desired
message. Id. at 473.
342. Id. at 479.
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relating to any of their specialty plates.343 Under this test, once a
state offers a “Choose Life” plate, it must offer plates expressing
(presumably all) other viewpoints on that subject.344 What is true
with respect to a “Choose Life” plate, though, is true for other
specialty plates (like a Sons of Confederate Veterans plate that
includes the image of a Confederate flag). To avoid impermissible
discrimination under the literal speaker test, states must either
allow opposing viewpoints on any subject covered by an existing
specialty plate—which could lead to a flood of different plates
advancing positions or groups with which North Carolina
disagrees—or do away with specialty plates altogether.345
For example, under the forum analysis used by many of the
circuit courts, if a state offers a Veterans of Foreign Wars plate, it
can be required to issue specialty plates questioning the cause for
which these veterans fought.346 Given that many states have a
longstanding relationship with the military and are home to
various military bases, these states also issue plates honoring
those who currently serve in various branches of the military.347
343. See id. at 480 (providing examples of how all viewpoints in the form of
monuments would have to be represented).
344. In his concurrence in Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, Judge Manion
contends that a “Choose Life” plate is viewpoint neutral because it presumes
that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to choose. 547 F.3d 853,
867–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., concurring). A specialty plate program
offering a Choose Life plate but not a Choose Abortion plate might be viewpoint
neutral:
But rather than devolve into the contentious debate about viewpoints
concerning the legality of abortion, a state could reasonably seek to
promote a common middle ground—shared by both those who
support and those who object to the Supreme Court’s decision to
legalize abortion. States which find the “Choose Life” plate provides a
positive non-confrontational area of shared consensus act reasonably
in that conclusion and do not engage in viewpoint discrimination.
Id. at 869.
345. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009) (noting that
if all monuments were permitted, most parks would respond by refusing all
donated monuments).
346. Id. (“Every jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial may
be asked to provide equal treatment for a donated monument questioning the
cause for which the veterans fought.”).
347. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4(a2) (2012) (providing standards for
license plates based on military service).
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Under the court’s public forum analysis, simply offering such
plates would force a state to issue plates criticizing the military
or those who serve in it—sending a message that directly
contravenes the state’s intended message.348 The state would be
forced to promulgate a wide variety of plates that directly
contravene its own preferred message or, at a minimum, to send
a message with which the state does not want to be associated.
By the same token, having issued a “Save the Sea Turtles”
plate, which expresses the state’s concern for and pride in its
coastal wildlife, the legislature may be asked to authorize a
countervailing alternative, such as “Kill the Sea Turtles” or “Let
the Sea Turtles Die.” Under the literal speaker test, when
confronted with such an alternative, the state would have to
accept the proposed plate (thereby promoting a message directly
at odds with its chosen view) or do away with the “Save the Sea
Turtles” plate.349 As the Court stated in Summum,
On this view, when France presented the Statue of Liberty to
the United States in 1884, this country had the option of
either (a) declining France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift, but
providing a comparable location in the harbor of New York for
other statues of a similar size and nature (e.g., a Statue of
Autocracy, if one had been offered by, say, the German Empire
or Imperial Russia).350

Given that states, such as North Carolina, offer a variety of
specialty plates, including “Support Our Troops,” “Friends of the
Great Smoky Mountains,” “In God We Trust,” “Kids First,” and
“Tobacco Heritage,”351 applying the Court’s forum analysis would
force these states either to allow opposing viewpoints—
“Undermine Our Troops,” “Clear-Cut the Great Smoky
Mountains,” “In Atheism We Trust,” “Kids Last,” and “Tobacco
348. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 480 (“If government entities must maintain
viewpoint neutrality . . . they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of
clutter’ or face the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished
monuments.”).
349. See id. (noting that government entities would have to either allow all
expressions, or none at all).
350. Id. at 479.
351. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4(b) (2012) (listing the numerous and
various specialty license plates offered).
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Causes Cancer”—or to terminate its specialty plate program.
Faced with a similar challenge to the content of a parade in
Hurley, the Court upheld the speaker’s right to determine the
content of the message:
Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals
with a message would have the right to participate in
petitioners’ speech, so that the communication produced by the
private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by
the law who wished to join in with some expressive
demonstration of their own. But this use of the State’s power
violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.352

The threat of conflicting messages is made worse by the fact
that there would be a number of viewpoints, and therefore a
number of proposed specialty plates, on any given topic. For
example, “Choose Life” and “Respect Choice” are not the only
viewpoints on abortion and, in fact, are not even necessarily
contradictory views in the abortion debate. Both slogans
presuppose that “choice” is appropriate. Put differently, by
advocating the choice of life, the state is acknowledging that the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose. As Judge Manion
put the point in his concurrence in White:
The [Choose Life] message acknowledges both choice and life,
so most people who claim to be pro-life and a large number of
people who claim to be pro-choice but personally opposed to
abortion should be comfortable with this message that is
directed at pregnant women who are contemplating abortion.
The petition expressly recognizes that it is the woman’s choice.
But at the same time it recognizes that the life of the
developing baby is also at stake.353

Through a “Choose Life” plate, the state is promoting childbirth
over abortion, and, in the process, admitting that there is a
constitutionally protected choice to be made. States are allowed to

352. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995).
353. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Manion, J., concurring).
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do this under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey:
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, . . .
the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s
choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this
interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.354

If the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are
correct and specialty plates create a forum, then states cannot
discriminate against any viewpoint relating to abortion.355
Going forward, states must allow all viewpoints to be heard.356
Consequently, even if a state wants to promote childbirth over
abortion through its specialty plate program, its legislature
must approve plates that express other viewpoints on abortion—
Pro-life, Pro-abortion, Anti-life, Anti-abortion, Fetuses Are
Persons, Fetuses Are Not Persons, Fetuses are persons after
viability, Fetuses are persons at conception, Every Child a
Wanted Child, Every Child is a Child, and the list could go on
and on. To avoid all of these discordant messages—messages that
conflict with the state’s preferred “Choose Life” message—the
state would have to shut down its specialty plate program. But as
Summum expressly states, “where the application of forum
analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it
is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”357
354. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
355. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding
that because Missouri’s specialty plate program allowed denial of an application
based on the organization’s viewpoint, it permitted viewpoint discrimination,
and thus violated the First Amendment); Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d
956, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that the license plate Commission
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment);
White, 547 F.3d at 853 (concluding that because the rejection of the “Choose
Life” license plate was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, there was no First
Amendment violation); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786,
799 (4th Cir. 2004) (deciding that South Carolina engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by distorting the forum in favor of its own pro-life view).
356. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965 (noting that Arizona is providing a forum
in which organizations can use the specialty license plates to express their First
Amendment rights and raise money for their organization).
357. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009); see also
Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 2 7 5 , 287 ( 4 t h C i r .
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Whether states will be flooded with requests for alternative
viewpoints if specialty plate programs are treated as designated
limited forums is not idle speculation under Summum. Pleasant
Grove City expressed the same concern in Summum, and the
Court held that the state’s “concerns are well founded.”358
According to the Court, “[i]f government entities must maintain
viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated monuments,
they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of clutter’ or face
the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished
monuments.”359 The same applies to specialty license plates, as
illustrated by the “Kill the Sea Turtles” example.
Even if no organization has petitioned a state for a “Kill the
Sea Turtles” plate, the threat to the government’s First
Amendment rights is the same as in the monument context.360 In
Summum, the Court highlighted the threat to the government’s
ability to convey its desired message with two examples that had
never occurred.361 In particular, the Court considered the possible
conflicts with the government’s message that might arise if the
forum doctrine applied and concluded that the forum doctrine,
therefore, did not apply.362 According to the Court, “[e]very
jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial may be
asked to provide equal treatment for a donated monument
questioning the cause for which the veterans fought.”363
Similarly, the Court determined that, under its forum analysis,
2 0 0 8 ) (explaining that because “government speech almost always supports
a given policy objective and ‘[t]he government is entitled to promote particular
messages,’ [the government] can surely ‘take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message[s] [are] neither garbled nor distorted’” (quoting
Griffin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 2001), and
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
358. Summum¸ 555 U.S. at 479.
359. Id. (citation omitted).
360. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing the threat in the
monument context, whereby government entities would have to either maintain
viewpoint neutrality, or brace for an influx of numerous monuments).
361. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80 (providing the veterans monument
and Statue of Liberty examples).
362. See id. at 480 (“But as a general matter, forum analysis simply does not
apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.”).
363. Id. at 480.
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accepting the Statue of Liberty would require the government to
accept monuments that are inconsistent with our nation’s values:
On this view, when France presented the Statue of Liberty
to the United States in 1884, this country had the option of
either (a) declining France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift,
but providing a comparable location in the harbor of New
York for other statues of a similar size and nature (e.g., a
Statue of Autocracy, if one had been offered by, say, the
German Empire or Imperial Russia).364

The same constitutional analysis applies to specialty
license plates. If a state honors its military and veterans of
foreign wars with their own plates, it would have to issue
plates “questioning the cause for which the veterans fought.”365
The threat of a monument questioning the cause for which our
veterans fought is as real as the threat of a specialty plate
challenging that cause.366 That no applications for antiveterans or antiwar plates may have been submitted
previously is not surprising. Given that the government
controls the specialty plate process, no one imagined that the
government would approve such plates. Under the literal
speaker test, though, the government loses its control over the
specialty plate process and, in turn, the message conveyed by
the overall program.367 As in Summum, states would be
required to convey messages that they disagree with and that
contradict the images of the states that they are trying to
promote.368 States would lose their right “to shape [their]
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent
on another.”369 Instead of promoting numerous messages that
are inconsistent with the image of a state that its elected
364. Id. at 479.
365. Id. at 480.
366. See id. at 479 (noting that concerns over alternative viewpoints being
promulgated were “well founded”).
367. See id. at 480 (noting that government entities would have to either
allow all expressions, or none at all).
368. See id. at 479–80 (providing the veterans monument and Statute of
Liberty examples).
369. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
574 (1995).
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representatives want to convey, states would have to shut
down their specialty plate programs.370
This is not to say that a state cannot create a designated
open or designated limited forum for specialty plates. Rather,
it is to recognize, consistent with Summum, that “[i]t certainly
is not common for property owners to open up their property
for the installation of permanent monuments [or specialty
plates] that convey a message with which they do not wish to
be associated.”371 States can create a forum for monuments on
public property if they want to, although it would be the rare
case:
To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the
forum doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent
monument—for example, if a town created a monument on
which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other
criterion) could place the name of a person to be honored or
some other private message. But as a general matter, forum
analysis simply does not apply to the installation of
permanent monuments on public property.372

Under such circumstances, a reasonable observer might
“routinely—and reasonably—interpret [the monument] as
conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”373
But the observer would be wrong. Because the government
relinquished its control over the monument, the government
would lose the protection of the government speech doctrine
even though a viewer would reasonably think that the
government was the speaker.374 As a result, the literal speaker
test, which is predicated on how a reasonable observer would
interpret the alleged government speech, cannot be used

370. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009) (noting
that if all monuments were permitted, most parks would respond by refusing all
donated monuments).
371. Id. at 471.
372. Id. at 480.
373. Id. at 471.
374. See id. at 471 (explaining that where the government has erected a
monument in a public park “there is little chance that observers will fail to
appreciate the identity of the speaker” as the government).
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reliably to distinguish government and private speech under
Summum and Johanns.375
The same is true with respect to specialty license plates.
Some states have created administrative procedures that
operate like the hypothetical monument in Summum that is
opened up for private messages and is subject to the Court’s
forum doctrine.376 Other states have not, deciding instead to
retain effective control and veto power over the entire
process.377 Thus, even under Summum’s control test, some
specialty plate programs, like those in Arizona and Missouri,
may create a limited designated forum.378 For example, in
Stanton, Arizona set up an administrative procedure for
specialty plates under which “[t]he Commission[ had] de
minimis editorial control over the plate design and color.”379
Organizations meeting specified criteria were entitled to have
their proposed license plates approved.380 Because the
Commission lacked effective control over the plate and its
message, Summum would support a finding that the state
created a forum for private speech and, therefore, could not
discriminate based on viewpoint.381
Under the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit
opinions, though, there is no difference between a specialty
plate program that sets up an administrative procedure (under
which specialty plates are approved without any meaningful
375. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Conti, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363,
371–72 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (differentiating the speech at issue in Summum and
Johanns from North Carolina’s specialty plate program at issue).
376. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-2404(B) (LexisNexis 2011) (outlining the
procedure for applying for the creation of a specialty license plate).
377. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563–64 (2005) (“And
Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability to
reform the program at any time. No more is required.”).
378. See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 971 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Finally, we note that the nature of the forum also supports a conclusion that
Arizona intended only to create a limited public forum.”).
379. Id. at 966.
380. See id. at 970 (“To gain access, the nonprofit organization must have its
application reviewed and approved by the Commission.”).
381. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009)
(describing how viewpoint neutrality would preclude the government from
selecting which monuments it wanted to have in the park).
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involvement or oversight by the government) and one that
requires the state legislature to enact legislation approving the
form and content of each new specialty plate.382 That is, the
circuit courts fail to distinguish between programs where a
state has minimal control and those where a state has total
control.383 Under Summum, this distinction is critical. Just as
there is a constitutionally significant difference between
monuments that the government controls and those that are
opened to the public to “place the name of a person to be
honored or some other private message,” there is a
constitutionally significant difference between these two types
of specialty plate programs.384 Yet the circuit courts’ literal
speaker test does not distinguish between the specialty plate
programs that require legislative action and the purely
administrative procedures that Arizona, Missouri, and other
states employ.385 Under the literal speaker test, specialty
plates are always associated with the vehicle owners, which
means a state’s specialty plate program always creates a
designated forum.386 The level of control that the government
exercises is irrelevant.387
The literal speaker test, therefore, contradicts the Court’s
analysis in Summum and should be rejected because it
prevents states and cities from “portray[ing through specialty
plates] what they view as appropriate for the place in
question.”388 Instead, once a state approves a specialty plate, it
must authorize plates advancing any viewpoint on the subject
382. See supra note 355 and accompanying text (citing circuit court opinions
holding that specialty plates create a forum).
383. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966 (“The Commission’s de minimis editorial
control over the plate design and color does not support a finding that the
messages conveyed by the organization constitute government speech.”).
384. Summum, 555 U.S. at 480.
385. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966–67 (9th Cir.
2008) (describing the literal speaker test and its application).
386. See id. at 968 (detailing the standards of a designated public forum as
it applied to Arizona’s “Choose Life” license plate).
387. See id. at 973 (noting that constitutional concerns outweigh
government discretion in regulating speech, even in the limited public fora of
license plate regulation).
388. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).
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matter of the original plate (subject only to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions).389 Accordingly, because
applying the Supreme Court’s “forum analysis would lead
almost inexorably to closing of the forum,” courts should reject
that analysis and find that legislature-controlled specialty
plate programs are government speech.390
V. Conclusion
When deciding if expressive activity is government or
private speech, the critical consideration under Johanns and
Summum is not whether a third party can identify the
government as the speaker but whether the government is
actually speaking.391 Where the government “sets the overall
message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated”392 or “has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages
sent . . . by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over the
selection”393 of the message, it may claim the fundamental
right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to choose the
content of its message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”394
Contrary to the majority of circuit courts that have
considered the constitutionality of specialty license plates,
states that approve such plates through legislative enactment
do exercise the requisite level of control to qualify for the
protection of the government speech doctrine.395 In such cases,
389. See id. at 479 (noting that viewpoint neutrality would lead to
government entities’ having to deal with an influx of clutter).
390. Id. at 480.
391. See id. at 470 (“Permanent monuments displayed on public property
typically represent government speech.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544
U.S. 550, 563–64, (2005) (noting the reasons the beef advertisements were
government speech).
392. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563.
393. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
394. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995).
395. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(F) (2012) (“The department may
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the legislature has final approval authority over the images
and wording that appear on all specialty plates.396 And just as
state legislatures create new specialty plates through statute,
they can revoke or amend any specialty plate by passing new
legislation.397 Thus, because these states exercise complete
control over the specialty plate program, “[n]o more is
required.”398
Furthermore, a finding that specialty plates are private
speech undermines a state’s right to speak for itself and
creates a heckler’s veto. If specialty plates authorized by
statute are private speech, states will be forced to approve a
wide range of specialty plates that send messages in conflict
with the states’ chosen messages.399 But as Summum expressly
holds, “where the application of forum analysis would lead
almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that
forum analysis is out of place.”400 To the extent that certain
citizens in a state dislike the messages that the state
promulgates through its specialty plate program, they can
avail themselves of the primary check on government speech—
the political process: “[A] government entity is ultimately
‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy . . . . If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials
later could espouse some different or contrary position.’”401
What they cannot do is force the government to convey a
message that is inconsistent with its view of the “image of the
alter, modify, or refuse to produce any special license plate that it deems
offensive or fails to meet community standards.”).
396. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4 (2012) (noting that the state retains
final approval authority over issuance of a specialty license plate).
397. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 371 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In
this case we are required to decide the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statute
making available the purchase of automobile license plates with a ‘Choose Life’
inscription, but not making available the purchase of automobile license plates
with a ‘pro-choice’ or pro-abortion rights message.”).
398. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 (2005).
399. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2009)
(noting that government entities will be required to allow all viewpoints or close
the forum).
400. Id. at 480.
401. Id. at 468–69.
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[state] that it wishes to project to all who” view the specialty
license plates.402 Under Summum, Johanns, and Hurley, a
state need not “Kill the Sea Turtles” on its specialty plates any
more than “Save” them. In fact, under the government speech
doctrine, it cannot be forced to convey any message with which
it disagrees.

402.

Id. at 473.

